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Religion in the Classroom in
Germany and the United States
Edward J. Eberle*
In this Article, ProfessorEberle evaluates the relationshipofreligion in the classroom in
Germany and the United States, as formulated by the countries' hghest courts, the Gennan
ConstitutionalCourt and the United States Supreme Court Pursuantto the German model of
church-state cooperation,public finds are channeled to religious organizations,such as, for
example, using the machineiy of the state to rise and disperse tax monies to religious
organizations. Religious groups may then use the tax monies collected to support religious
education in the public schools. However, pursuant to guidelines announcedby the German
ConstitutionalCourt, teaching ofreligious tenets can only occur in religion class and ample
opportunity must be given to students to choose or not choose the otpe ofreligious instruction
they desire. Apart from religionclass,dominant Clinstianityis to be treatedonly as a partof the
historical tadition of western civilization and not as a missionary exercise; no religious
indoctrinationmay occur onpublicschoolpremises outside ofrligionclass.
By contnas4 the languageandEnlightenment backgroundofthe American Establishment
Clausereasonablysuggestsa more separationistapproachto church-state relations. It is fair to
say that a separationistapproachstill largely applies with respect to public schools. However,
the formal neutnalityadvancedby the Rehnquist Court reconceives church-staterelations along
distinctlymore accommodationistgroundsconceming private,parochialschools. Employing a
core doctrine of (1) neutralityand (2) private, genuine choice--principlesthat resonatepartly
with German doctrine-substantialpublic aid has been dispensed to private, religious schools,
as we will examine hI this way, religiousinstitutions can be accommodatedin society on the
same basis as secular institutions. We can see that recent American Establishment Clause
doctrine has unfolded in a way somewhat characteristicof German church-state relations in
respect of public support for religious teaching in schools. For comparative purposes, it is
strking that American doctrine has so evolved notwithstanding a much different historical
understandingand constitutionallanguage.
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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between religion and state remains a central
question today, notwithstanding centuries of deliberation and strife
over the proper calibration of the two powers. The community of
believers that is a church, synagogue, or mosque is a self-associated
people of faith. The state is the politically authorized agent of the
society. We might say that a church (to pick a common term) is the
domain of religion, the state the domain of government.
In modem Western society, Martin Luther's inspired Protestant
Reformation (1517-1545) reverberated throughout much of Europe,
challenging the long-standing alliance between one, universal Catholic
Church and its delegation of secular authority to a ruling prince under
a theory of the divine right of kings.' This epoch of European history
formed an important influence in the evolution of German religious
freedoms.
The fight over religion dramatically influenced England in the
next century as well. England descended into civil war (1642-1645)
over the role and locus of power--Crown versus Parliament-and the
role of religion--Church of England versus Catholicism versus

1.
See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10 RoGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 289, 308-09 (2005). Luther's revolution of the Reformation divided
those yet faithful to the Catholic Church from dissenting believers who became known as
Protestants. Id. The battle over how to align the relationship between church and state raged
over the European continent as the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), ending in a type of peace
with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which reaffirmed the principle of cius regio, eius
religio (literally "who is ruler, is religion," meaning that the religion of a territory or people
shall be that of its ruler), which was established in the Religion Peace of Augsburg, in 1555,
as a compromise between German princes advocating the cause of Catholicism or
Lutheranism. Id.; Treaty of Westphalia, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Consol. TS. 198. Mandatory belief
in the sovereign's religion was the standard European solution to achieving social harmony in
religious matters. Eberle, suprm; at 308-09. Germans took note of the fact that the religious
dissension decimated one-third of the population. Seeid.
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separatist Protestant denominations such as the Puritans.2 This
moment of English history formed what became the great American
experiment in the relationship between church and state, which
gestated uniquely into a "livlie experiment" of separation of church
and state begun in Providence colony, in 1638, by Roger Williams.'
Church-state relations remain contentious in the United States,
despite or because of our "livlie experiment." The separationist stance
previously championed by the Warren Court has been diluted, in part,
by a variety of formal neutrality advanced by the Rehnquist Court.!
Under formal neutrality, religious groups are to be treated under the
same terms as nonreligious groups with respect to the distribution of
public benefits.' Pursuant to formal neutrality, public funds have been
dispensed to religion for sign interpreters, remedial education, and
parochial school tuition, among other purposes. Such overt support of
religion would have been unthinkable under the separationist regime of
the Warren Court.

2.
(1972).
3.

See

SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM,

A RELIGIOUS

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

361

CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS OF 1663, reprintedin
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS
OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 3211, 3212 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) ("[T]o hold forth a livlie

experiment, that a most flourishing civill state may stand and best bee maintained... with a
full libertie in religious concemements.").
4.
See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (holding that no state or
school could require that passages from the Bible be read at the beginning of a school day).
But see Zobrest v. Caterna Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993) (holding that the
state may dispense public funds to provide a sign interpreter to a deaf child in a sectarian
school).
5.
I am describing the Rehnquist Court's approach to public funding issues under
the Establishment Clause as "formal neutrality." This categorization is a form of the concept
developed famously by Philip B. Kurland, OfChurch and State and the Supreme Court 29 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 96 (1961), and then reworked by Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 999-1001 (1990). I use
interchangeably the term "accommodation" or "accommodationist" to describe the Rehnquist
Court approach. By accommodationist, I mean accommodating religious institutions within
society in ways equal to secular institutions. Another way of describing the same judicial
approach would be nonpreferentialism, meaning government may not prefer or disfavor one
particular religion over another, or religion over nonreligion. Many people associate
nonpreferentialism as meaning, simply, the inability of government to prefer or disfavor one
religion over another, which is why I have chosen not to so describe the approach of the
Rehnquist Court (which clearly is not that).
6.
See Zobrest,509 U.S. at 13-14.
7.
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000).
8.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983).
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To obtain some perspective on church-state relations,' and
especially the evolution of Establishment Clause doctrine" under the
Rehnquist Court, we will look outside American borders to another
important constitutional democracy, Germany. We will examine in
some detail how church-state relations are formulated in the charter of
the German Basic Law and then how religious protections are
formulated by the highest constitutional courts of the two lands, the
United States Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court.
There are, of course, many components to the complicated
relationship between church and state in modem constitutional
democracy, including the degree to which a state supports religion, the
overt display of religious symbols in the public square or school,"
accommodation of religious institutions within society, and the degree
of autonomy allowed religious institutions to run their own affairs. A
broad look at church-state relations would entail these components and
more.
But our focus will be much narrower. We will concentrate on the
role of the state in promoting religion in society's primary,
preuniversity schools. Focusing on elementary and secondary schools
makes sense because schools are primary forums for society's
inculcation of the values and mores it wishes to instill in its younger,
developing members. We might think of the school as the training
ground for citizen participation in society. The role of government in
promoting religion can be important in this regard. Conceiving
religion as a source of salvation, or as a source of ethics, can be useful
personally or socially. Moreover, judging society by its charter to
determine if it remains true to or strays from the ideals therein
inscribed is also an important lesson of citizenship to impart to
students. These matters speak to the capacity of a constitution to direct
Apart from the contrast between the Warren Court (separationism) and the
9.
Rehnquist Court (accommodationism), there might be other ways of conceiving church-state
relations as well. We might consider, for example, mergings of religion and state, as in Iran
and Pakistan; established state churches, as in Greece and the United Kingdom; de facto
established churches, as in Spain or Portugal; or church-state cooperation, as in Germany, to
name some other possibilities of arranging affairs of church and state in constitutional
democracy.
10. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding that prayer at a
11.
middle school graduation ceremony is unconstitutional), with Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 16, 1995, 93 Entscheidungen des

Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1(1) (ER.G.) (holding the Bavarian requirement to
display a crucifix in public school classrooms unconstitutional).
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society. Staying true to a charter's religious ideals is, of course,
difficult.
As we examine the evidence under review, we may be surprised
by what we find. Pursuant to the German model of church-state
cooperation, German public funds are channeled to religious
organizations, for example, by using the machinery of the state to raise
and disperse tax monies to religious organizations.'2 Religious groups
may then use the tax monies collected to support religious education in
the public schools. However, pursuant to guidelines announced by the
German Constitutional Court, teaching of religious tenets can only
occur in religion classes and ample opportunity must be given to
students and parents (when their children are under fourteen years of
age) to choose or not choose the type of religious instruction they
desire.'3 Apart from religion class, dominant Christianity is to be
treated only as a part of the historical tradition of Western civilization
and not as a missionary exercise; no religious indoctrination may occur
on school premises outside of religion class. " Moreover, with the
emerging challenge of pluralism in German society, as in other
European societies, German religious freedoms have been extended to
embrace minority religions on essentially equal terms to majority
religions under principles of toleration, neutrality, and equality.'"
By contrast, the language and Enlightenment background of the
American Establishment Clause reasonably suggests a more
separationist approach to church-state relations. It is fair to say that a
separationist approach still largely applies with respect to public
schools. However, the formal neutrality advanced by the Rehnquist
Court reconceives church-state relations along distinctly more
accommodationist grounds concerning private, parochial schools.'7 As
we will examine, by employing a core doctrine of (1) neutrality and
(2) private, genuine choice-principles that resonate partly in German
doctrine-substantial public aid has been dispensed to private,
12. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 443 (2d ed. 1997).
13.
GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Federal
Constitution] art. 7(2) (ER.G.) (granting parents the right to decide whether children receive
religious instruction).
14.
See KOMMERS, supra note 12, at 470.
15.
For a study of this in relation to Free Exercise freedoms, see Edward J. Eberle,
Free Exercise ofReligion in Germany and the United States, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1023, 1067-68,
1085 (2004).
16.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17.
See Kurland, supra note 5, at 72.

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 81:67

religious schools.'8 In this way, society can accommodate religious
institutions on the same basis as secular institutions.
We can see that recent American Establishment Clause doctrine
has unfolded in a way somewhat characteristic of German church-state
relations with respect to public support for religious teaching in
schools. For comparative purposes, it is striking that American
doctrine has so evolved notwithstanding its very different history and
constitutional language. So, we stand in the interesting position where
American church-state relations are more similar to German churchstate cooperation than to Providence- or Virginia-influenced churchstate separation with respect to state support of religion in private
schools.
To explore these themes, this Article will first examine the text of
each country's constitution and then turn to an examination of the
complicated nature of church-state relations in Germany, together with
the historical backdrop of the framing of German (in Part II) and
American (in Part III) religious protections. It is important to
understand the historical context of both countries' religious freedoms
in order to appreciate their development. Next, in Parts IV (Germany)
and V (America), we will turn to the topic at hand: examining the
degree of state support of religion in schools. We will then, in Part VI,
assemble the observations we have drawn by comparing German to
American law.
H.

GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND TRADITION

A.

German Text

The main outline of the relationship between church and state
centers on Article 140 of the Basic Law, which incorporates as an
organic whole the provisions of the 1919 Weimar Constitution
(Articles 136 through 139 and 141) describing that relationship." The
relationship is a cooperative one. Religion and church play a
prominent role in German society, which these provisions facilitate."
The Weimar provisions set out a detailed and complicated scheme of
church-state cooperation that is interpreted in the light of Article 4 of
18.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
19. See VERFASSUNG FUR DIE WEIMAR REICHS [VERF. WEIMAR] [Weimar
Constitution] arts. 136-139, 141 (ER.G.); Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of Religion i Public
Schools in Germanyandin the UnitedStates,28 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 405, 442 (2000).
20. See generally KOMMERS, supra note 12 (discussing the role of the church in
Germany). Portions of Parts II.A through II.C of this Article appear in Eberle, supra note 15.
Use of those portions of that article is with permission of the Tulane Law Review.
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the German Constitution free exercise of religion protections, which
protect explicitly freedoms of faith, conscience, and philosophical
creed.' The tendency today is to interpret Articles 4 and 140 as
reciprocal religious protections."
Article 136 of the Weimar Constitution secures civil and political
rights, including eligibility for public office, freedom from dependence
or restriction based on religious belief or exercise, protection against
coerced disclosure of religious conviction, coerced performance of
religious acts or ceremonies, and coerced taking of religious oaths.2 3 It
also prohibits the government from inquiring into membership in a
religious body, except for statistical purposes.
Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution, in its first clause, states
that "there is no state church."25 In comparison to the broad, albeit
disputed, meaning of the American prohibition on "an establishment of
religion" the German clause has a more commonly accepted meaning.
It forbids (1) institutional interconnection between church and state
and (2) identification of the state with a specific religion. 6 The clause
does not mean strict separation of church and state. The numerous
remaining provisions of Article 137 guarantee the freedom of
association to form religious bodies and to "regulate[] and administer
[their] affairs independently within the limits of the law" 28 to constitute
religious bodies to "acquire the legal capacity according to the general
provisions of civil law"29 and to constitute "corporations under public
law,"3 allowing them "to levy taxes... inaccordance with Land [state]
law."3 ' This last provision is completely without parallel in American
law.32
21.
22.

See GG art. 4.
See Muehlhoff, supra note 19, at 451 (describing the interplay of Articles 4 and

140).
23.
SeeVERF. WEIMAR art. 136.
24. Id.
25. Id art. 137(l).
26. See id.
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
27.
245 (1994).
28. VERF. WEIMAR art. 137(3).
29. Id.art. 137(4).
30. Id.art. 137(5).
31.
Id.art. 137(6).
32. James Madison strongly objected to officially granting charters to religious
bodies. See CURRIE, supa note 27, at 245 & n.7 (citing 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 982-85 (1811))
(viewing federal incorporation of the Episcopal Church in Washington, D.C., as an
establishment of religion); see also Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of
Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559, 1587 (1989) (explaining that James Madison
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Under the more pervasive approach of German law, the state
provides the legal framework for religious bodies to operate, and then
offers the machinery of government to administer and collect taxes for
religious purposes. In keeping with the neutral, nondiscriminatory
nature of German law, these benefits are available to associations of a
33
"philosophical creed" as well as religious ones.
In practice, the main beneficiaries of governmental aid are
dominant religious bodies such as Protestant and Roman Catholic
groups. 4 Because church and state tend to consist of overlapping
majoritarian configurations, church-state cooperation has been a
comfortable fit.35 In a sense, the structure of church-state cooperation

operates as a de facto establishment. The cooperative model has
functioned well in a society of relative religious homogeneity.36 Since
the cooperative model was developed in 1919 with an eye to
demonstrated his commitment to separation of church and state by vetoing bills incorporating
the Episcopal Church in Washington, D.C. and reserving federal land for a Baptist Church).
Before the turn of the nineteenth century, Virginia outlawed religious corporations, a
prohibition still in place in West Virginia. See W VA. CONST. art. 6, § 47. This prohibition
was also in place until 2002 in Virginia. See Falwell v. Miller, 203 E Supp. 2d 624, 632 (WD.
Va. 2002) (finding that Article four, section fourteen, of Virginia's Constitution violates the
Free Exercise Clause); see also John Witte, Jr., The EssentialRights andLibertiesofReligion
in the American ConstitutionalExperiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 385 (1996) (stating
that the Virginia legislature prohibited religious corporations before the turn of the nineteenth
century). It is fair to point out that most religious organizations today are incorporated as
nonprofit corporations and receive tax-exempt status and, thus, bear some similarity to
German religious corporations.
33.
SeeVERF. WEIMAR art. 137(7).
34. The Seventh-Day Adventist Church, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
Baptist Church, New Apostolic Church, Pentecostal communities, Christian Scientists,
Mennonites, and the Salvation Army, among others, have achieved recognition as public law
corporations. See Gerhard Robbers, ReligiousFreedom in Germany,2001 BYU L. REV 643,
649-50. Other minority religions have had some difficulty achieving official recognition.
This may, in part, be due to differences in held values. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses
have historically been denied official privileges because the sect does not allow its members
to vote and participate in the democratic process. Id.
at 650. Authorities thus viewed the sect
as animated by values antithetical to the social order and, accordingly, a danger to society.
Gerhard Besiar & Renate-Maria Besiar, Jehovah " Witnesses 'Request for Recognition as a
Corporation Under Public Law in Germany: Backgroun4 Current Status, and Empirical
Aspects, 43 J.CHURCH & ST. 35, 37 (2001). However, recently Jehovah's Witnesses acquired
recognition as a public corporation in a significant Constitutional Court case, signaling an
important evolution in German thought toward toleration. See BVerfG Dec. 19, 2000, 102
BVerfGE 370 (371) (Jehovah's Witness Case); Eberle, supranote 15, at 1031.
35.
See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Private Religious Choice in German and American
ConstitutionalLaw Government Funding and Government Religious Speech, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1127, 1140, 1145 (1998) (noting that in post-World War II Germany, church
and state have promoted a consensus of values that includes promotion of democracy and
tolerance).
36.
See Muehlhoff, supra note 19, at 488-89 (observing that the church-state
cooperative model may be harder to implement as religious groups become more diverse).
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pluralism,37 it is possible the model will continue to function well
under new circumstances of emerging religious diversity. The model
was designed for all religious groups, not just the big churches of
Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.38
Under the system, employers withhold the monies collected as
taxes and submit them to the state, which then distributes them to the
religious denominations in a percentage equal to their membership.39
The churches pay the costs of administration. Religious groups use
the money collected to build seminaries, churches, hospitals, and
nursing homes, and to train teachers.4" These arrangements are a
mainstay by which religion secures its place as a main, if not a
preferred, actor within society. Conversely, state support of religion
allows government to exert some control over religion, including the
set of values to be inculcated, such as promotion of morality,
democracy, and tolerance." The tax is between eight and ten percent
of a person's state income tax.42 Any person whose name is on the
church or religious body's register is automatically subject to the tax."
A person must formally withdraw from the church or religious body to
be relieved from the tax. ' Nonchurch members are not assessed the
tax.45
Article 138 of the Weimar Constitution guarantees religious
bodies rights, including the right to own property.46 Article 139
recognizes Sunday and other public holidays "as days of rest from
work and of spiritual edification " '7 expressly resolving an issue that
has proved vexing to American law.48 Article 141 provides for the

37. Id at 439,442, 446.
See KOMMERS, supra note 12, at 440-41; Conversation with Dr. Hans Michael
38.
Heinig, Heidelberg, Germany (July 2005).
39. Eberle, supra note 15, at 1031.
40. Id
41.
Wuerth, supra note 35,at 1140, 1145-46.
42. KOMMERS, supa note 12, at 485.
43.
See id.
44. While state collection of church taxes is constitutional, it has nevertheless given
rise to significant litigation. See CURRIE, supra note 27, at 247; KOMMERS, supra note 12, at
484-89.
45. KOMMERS, supra note 12, at 485-86.
46.

VERF. WEIMAR art. 138.

47. Id.art. 139.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1961) (rejecting an
See, e.g.,
48.
Establishment Clause challenge to a Sunday closing law because Sundays were secular days
of rest, even though they originally were conceived as days of repose for religious reasons).
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rendering of religious services and spiritual care to the army, hospital,
prisons, or other public institutions. 9
In addition to these express provisions that address religion, the
Basic Law protects religion in a number of articles that cover other
subjects as well. For our purposes, quite relevant is Article 6 of the
German Constitution, which guarantees parental rights in the raising of
children, subject to state supervision. ° Parental rights come into play
most dramatically in connection with their children's education, the
rights of which are guaranteed in Article 7.51 Also notable to us is the
determination, in Article 7, section 3, that "[r]eligious classes [shall]
form[] part of the regular curriculum in state schools, with[in] the
exception of (secular (bekenntnisfrei)) schools .... [R]eligious
instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the religious
communit[ies]."5 2 Teaching religion in the schools is relatively
uncontroversial.53 However, the German constitutional system is
careful to protect against coercion of conscience. Article 7 further
provides, "The persons entitled to bring up a child shall have the right
to decide whether the child shall attend religious classes."5 Further,
"No teacher may be obliged against his will to give religious
instruction."55
Because setting educational policy is a matter for the German
states (Liindet) under German principles of federalism, the Lhnder
determine what is appropriate educationally." Article 141 of the Basic
Law preserves the historical right of Liinderto determine if religion is

49.

SCeVERF. WEIMAR art. 141.

50. GG art. 6(2) ("[T]he care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents
and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in the
performance of this duty.").
51.

See id. art. 7.

52.
Id. art. 7(3). The State has supervisory obligations concerning education too, as
set forth in Article 7(1): "The entire school system shall be under the supervision of the
State." Id art. 7(1). These ideas flow from the German theory of assigning duties to official
power to secure civil peace, aid conceptions of freedom, and concretize the core values of the
Basic Law. Under German constitutionalism, the idea is made manifest in the conception of
basic rights, which have an objective or positive dimension that animates the value structure
as well as the subjective or negative dimension that they share with American law. A further
important contrast between the two constitutions is that the Basic Law affects all legal
relationships, public and private, under the theory of third-party effect (Daittwirkung). For
elaboration of these theoretical differences, see EDwARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY:
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANYANDTHE UNITED STATES 25-32 (2002).

53.
54.
55.
56.

SeeKMMERS, supranote 12, at 471.
GG art. 7(2).
Id.art. 7(3).
See KOMMERS, supranote 12, at 471.
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to be offered at all." Under the principle of Article 141, the German
states of Bremen and Berlin do not offer religious instruction in the
schools.58 Likewise, Brandenburg does not offer religious instruction
in the schools, although it is unclear whether this follows from the
principle of Article 141." 9 Like the Article 137 provisions, the
guarantees of religious instruction in public schools represent once
more the German idea of church-state cooperation in certain essential
social services.6" There are yet other provisions of the Basic Law
addressing religion.'
We can see that the German charter is indeed far more detailed
and comprehensive in its treatment of religion than the U.S. charter.
There are advantages to the German detail. The German charter
expressly resolves many issues that in the United States have called for
Supreme Court resolution in parsing out the sparse language of the
First Amendment. For example, Article 4 resolves the status of
conscientious objection to military service,62 an issue that has proved
thorny for the Supreme Court. 3 Article 7 significantly resolves the
role of religion in public schools, 64 an issue of great contention in the
United States.65 It is noteworthy that there are far fewer decisions on

church-state relations issued by the German Constitutional Court than
in the United States; the greater detail of the Basic Law would seem to
make a difference.
Constitutional text is just one part of a country's constitution.
History, framers' intent, and constitutional structure are other
indispensable elements of constitutional law, at least under the canons
57.

SeeVERF. WEIMAR art. 141.

58. Article 141 provides, "The first sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 7 shall not be
applied in any Land in which different provisions of Land law were in force on 1 January
1949." Id. Article 141 is known as the "Bremen Clause," because it acknowledged the
historical omission of religion in the Bremen schools. After German reunification, in 1990,
Berlin in its entirety and the former East German state of Brandenburg became part of the
Federal Republic of Germany. See Wuerth, supra note 35, at 1152, 1154. These states
omitted mandatory teaching of religion. For a discussion of this, see infh text accompanying
note 224.
59. See Wuerth, supra note 35, at 1152, 1154.
60. See Muehlhoff,supra note 19, at 439-40.
61. See, e.g., GG art. 3(3) (providing that faith and religious opinion are
inappropriate subjects to target under the basic equality norm); id.
art. 56 (providing that the
federal President shall assume office upon taking oath, with or without reference to God); id
art. 64(2) (providing the same regarding the federal Chancellor and federal ministers).
62. Id. art. 4.
63. See, e.g., Welsh v.United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (plurality opinion);
United States v.Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
64. See GG art. 7.
65. See infra Part V
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of American constitutional methodology. Not surprisingly, German
history and constitutionalism differ from their American counterparts.
Under German constitutionalism, decisive in methodology is the text
and structure of the charter and its applicability to contemporary social
conditions. 66 Framers' intent is not dispositive in achieving results, but
may be consulted as an auxiliary aid to interpretation.67 We need a
brief overview of these issues to understand the context and dynamics
of German law.
B.

GermanHistory

As a European country, Germany shares a common and deep
cultural heritage with its continental neighbors. First, notable for us is
the long-standing influence of the Catholic Church. The Catholic
Church helped preserve learning during the early Middle Ages,
especially before the renaissance of Roman law and its systematic
study in a university forum in Bologna at the end of the eleventh
century.6 Reading, writing, mathematics, accounting, and the study of
science and philosophy were some of the bodies of knowledge that
found refuge and nurture within the Church.69 The deep association of
the Catholic Church with learning is a factor in the cooperative
relationship that has developed between church and state over
education.
Second, for much of German history, altar and throne were
united." The alliance between the ruler and the church further fortified
this cooperative relationship. The Reformation, led by Martin Luther,
played a role in this as well. Luther relied on the protection of tolerant
German princes from Catholic authorities to safeguard his life and
teachings.'
Reliance on state power to protect religion is another factor
leading toward a cooperative church-state relationship. Protestantism
was also the crucial force in the literacy campaign of this time.
Protestants founded schools so every child could read the Bible, the
defining focus of Luther's Reformation. 2 Reading allowed a person to
66. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and
American ConstitutionalLaw,1997 UTAH L. REv 963, 969-7 1.
67. Id.
68.
See Eberle, supa note 15, at 1034.
69. See id
70.

SeeKOMMERS, supra note 12, at 489.

71.
SeeEberle, supranote 15, at 1034.
72.
See Richard Gawthrop & Gerald Strauss, Protestantism and Litercy in Early
Modern Germany, 104 PAST & PRESENT 31 passim (1984); cf JOHN WILLtAM PERRIN, THE
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understand scripture by his or her own lights, facilitating direct
communication with God.
Related to this is the long history of governmental accord with
religious authorities, reached by formal treaties called concordats,
which governed issues involving religious education, social services,
and the like.73 Church and religion have played a much more active
public role in German life than in American life, and these factors
influence the modem German idea of church-state cooperation.
However, unlike England or France, Germany has never had an
official, established state church, although Lutheranism or other forms
of Protestantism effectively functioned as de facto established
churches in several of the German states before unification in 1871 .
Third, German society has historically been very homogenous.
In the crucial early time when religious ideas and tradition were
formed, Germans shared much in common. Today, German society is
becoming a more pluralistic society.
Still, Germany is more
5
homogenous than the United States.
Fourth, religious tolerance came late to Germany. Until the
Weimar Constitution of 1919, church-state relations were close and
religious discrimination was widespread.
With Protestantism
effectively operating as the official church in much of the Prussiandominated German Reich during the nineteenth century, Roman
Catholics, who were one-third of the population, were often barred
from high positions in the Reich government, and Jews were routinely
excluded from public service and the army. 6 Historically, German
constitutions distinguished between dominant churches (Lutheran,
other Protestant, and Roman Catholic) and minor sects.77
Fifth, the Basic Law is framed specifically against the horrors of
the Hitler era.78 Most notable is the securing of the social order on the
premise of the inviolability of human dignity. 9 This centers the society
(Meadville, Pa., ChautauquaCentury Press 1896).
73.
SeeEberle, supra note 15, at 1034.
74.
Id. at 1035. Germany achieved unity as a country relatively late, only in 1871
under Bismarck. By this time, Lutheran, Catholic, and Jewish religions were well established
in Germany. Id.
75. Roughly eight percent of the German population is composed of minorities. The
largest minority group is Turkish. Roughly three percent of the German population is
Muslim. See EBERLE, supranote 52, at 49.
76. See Eberle, supm note 15, at 1035.
77.
See KOMMERS, supra note 12, at 444-45.
78.
SeeEberle, supmanote 15, at 1035.
79. See id.
HISTORY OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN NEW ENGLAND
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around the human person and her flourishing. Religious freedoms, in
particular, are indispensable to this vision because the spirituality of
religion or belief in some other ideal is a core element of the
development of human personality. Only with the lessons learned
from the Hitler era did Germany secure freedom from coercion of
conscience, the essence of religious freedom discovered and
elaborated on centuries earlier by Roger Williams," John Locke,8' and
James Madison." Thus, development of religious freedom along these
Enlightenment lines in Germany was a late affair. 3
In the post-World War II era, the framers of the Basic Law
continued the tradition of church-state cooperation. The churches were
poised to help in the reconstruction of Germany, as they were less
4 This was
tainted than other institutions by an association with Hitler."
an additional factor that facilitated the major role of church and
religion in German society. 5
All of this German history provides a very different background
than the familiar American story of the influential period just prior to
the adoption of the United States Constitution, during which Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison led crucial developments to secure
freedom of conscience and faith and to institute separation of church
and state. This experience in Virginia provided the main model for the
framing of American religious protections. 6
On the other hand, Germany and the United States share an
important link in history: The flowering of religious liberty, through
judicial protection, occurred after World War II. The Basic Law is a
1949 document framed in reaction to the abuse of governmental power
80.

See ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION FOR CAUSE OF
(Richard Groves ed., Mercer Univ. Press 2001) (1644).
See JOHN LOCKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION, reprintedin JOHN LOCKE:

CONSCIENCE

81.

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION IN FoCus 12, 40 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds.,

1991).
82.

See Letter from James Madison to the Honorable the General Assembly of the

Commonwealth of Virginia:

A Memorial and Remonstrance (Oct. 1785), in THE MIND OF

(Marvin Meyers
ed., 1973) [hereinafter Letter from Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance] ("[Liberty of
conscience is] precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil
Society.").
83.
Of course, the forces at work before and after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia
formulated important religious protections. See supm text accompanying note 1.
84. See Eberle, supm note 15, at 1034-35.
85.
See KOMMERS, supranote 12, at 490.
86. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437 (1961); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947); see also Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1572 n.54
(collecting authorities).
THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 8
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exercised during the Hitler era.87 Interestingly, however, we also
observe that state governments' curtailment of liberties led to the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment so
that federal rights would be applicable to the states as well. Included
in this incorporation were the Free Exercise Clause in 194088 and the
Establishment Clause in 1947.89

Modem Establishment Clause

jurisprudence began with Everson v Board of Education in 1947.'
The first of very few successful Free Exercise claims was made in
1963 in Sherbert v Verner'
III. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND TRADITION

A.

American Text

In contrast to the detail of the German Basic Law, the U.S.
Constitution enumerates religious liberty in only two places: the First
Amendment "2 and Article VI, Clause 3, which provides, "[N]o
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States." 3 The Religious Test Clause was
designed to prevent the bitter English experience of flushing out
dissenters or those not loyal enough to the English Crown, mainly
Roman Catholics, atheists, or separatists, a practice which also
continued in the colonies and early states.' The practice of requiring
religious tests through mandated oaths stubbornly persisted until 1961,
when the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional, illustrating how
social reality can often lag behind a constitutional ideal. 5 There is
little other jurisprudence under the Religious Test Clause, as most
issues relating to religion have involved interpretation of the First
Amendment religious freedoms.

87. SeeEberle, supra note 15, at 1036.
88. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940).
89. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
90. Id.
91.
374 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1963).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
93.
Id.art. VI, cl.3.
94. See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1576-77. American colonists
commonly used English test oaths to support Anglican and Congregational establishments.
Id. Early state constitutions commonly required test oaths as preconditions to hold public
office. Id This history was a main motivation for prohibiting mandated religious oaths in
Article VI of the Constitution. See id at 1577-78.
95.
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494-96 (1961) (holding that a Maryland
constitutional provision requiring state officials to declare belief in God was
unconstitutional).
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Textually, the First Amendment singles out religion in two ways.

The Establishment Clause delimits governmental 6 power over religion
by prohibiting it from establishing religion. The Free Exercise Clause
highlights religion for preferred treatment by singling it out, over other
topics such as politics, commerce, or property, as meriting freedom

from governmental prohibition.97 So, we can see there is an interesting
relationship, if not tension, between the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.98 The Establishment Clause would appear to

single out religion for some form of official inaction; the Free Exercise
Clause would seem to single out religious activity for some form of
favored treatment.

There are both similarities and differences between the two
religion clauses. Summarily stated, both the Establishment Clause and

the Free Exercise Clause have in common a concern for protection of
the individual voluntariness of religious choice, notably expressed by a
guarantee of liberty of conscience and its concomitant guard against

coercion of conscience." We might say liberty of personal conscience
is the common, core ideal of the two Clauses.

However, the two

Clauses differ over strategy. The Establishment Clause is primarily
institutionally based; that is, it delimits governmental power over
religion and safeguards the voluntariness of individual and group
96. With the incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment, which extended its reach against state actions, it is more appropriate to speak of
government, and not the First Amendment's chosen words of "Congress," as the object of the
Clause. SeeEverson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). In this Article, I address only the
postincorporation period of the Establishment Clause, where the Supreme Court is the main
source of Establishment Clause values, not state government, as had been the case before the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause. Interestingly, Justice Thomas has recently argued
for broader deference to states over religious matters more in keeping with the
preincorporation state of affairs. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("I have previously suggested that the [Establishment] Clause's text
and history 'resis[t] incorporation' against the States."); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the same principle);
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677-80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Iln the
Context of the Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms
....
.).
97.
See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
98.
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Reasonable minds can disagree about how to apply the Religion
Clauses in a given case. But the goal of the Clauses is clear: to carry out the Founders' plan
of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. By
enforcing the Clauses, we have kept religion a matter for the individual conscience .... ");
Locke v.Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) ("These two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension ... [but] 'there is room for play in the
joints ... ').
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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choice over religion.

100

The Free Exercise

Clause is mainly

individually based. People, not government, are empowered to choose
and act on religious tenets as one of the score of natural rights
enshrined in the Constitution.'' This Article cannot work out the
difficult tension between these clauses, a tension produced by an
Establishment Clause that constrains government with respect to
religion and a Free Exercise Clause that empowers religious exercise.
Appropriate is Justice Kennedy's observation that the limits of the Free
Exercise Clause lie in the Establishment Clause, in contrast to the
structural protection of free speech.' 2
Turning more directly to the Establishment Clause, it seems fair
to say the United States Supreme Court works with very limited
textual authority. While we might all agree that the Establishment
Clause constrains official actions concerning religion, there is no
general consensus over exactly what degree and nature of constraint is
required. Perhaps we can only come up with this commonly accepted
meaning: (1) there can be no established church, (2) there can be no
preference of one religion over another religion, and (3) there can be
no coercion of religious faith or practice.
Still, given the
Establishment Clause's constraint on governmental authority, the text
would seem to signal a presumption against governmental involvement
in religion.
Not surprisingly, the Court has had much difficulty translating
this majestic generality into a workable standard of law. For example,
at the end of the 2004-2005 term, the Court ruled, 5-4 each time, that
Texas could display a large monument of the Ten Commandments with
explicit religious inscription on its state capitol grounds because it was
surrounded by twenty-one other historical markers and seventeen other
monuments of various types and, therefore, it seemed more
"historical" than "religious."'0 3 However, a Kentucky courtroom could
not display a framed copy of the Ten Commandments, even when later
surrounded by other historical material of religious meaning, because
the display was too religious.'" We can see that it is hard to reach
agreement on what the Establishment Clause means.
100. See id.
101. Seeid
102. "The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that
has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment, but the Establishment
Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no
precise counterpart in the speech provisions" Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).
103. SeeVan Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854,2862-64 (2005).
104. SeeMcCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2730-32, 2745 (2005).
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Since the Court started applying the Establishment Clause
vigorously in 1947,05 it has vacillated uneasily between separationist
and accommodationist stances. In Everson, all nine members of the
Court employed separationist rhetoric, but the Court split 5-4 in
applying the doctrine to the facts, upholding state-supported bussing of
Roman Catholic schoolchildren.

106

The Court analogized state-

provided bussing to other safety and welfare services, like police or
fire protection. 7
B.

American History

A deeper look at American history at the time of the Framing of
the Constitution reveals a similar plurality of differing views. '
American religious history is more complicated than commonly
thought, and consists, at least, of a contest between separationism and
accommodationism. This contest is long-running and continues to
percolate quite strongly today.
The crucial developments in Virginia led first by Thomas
Jefferson, and then, during the Assessment controversy of 1784-1786,
by James Madison, Patrick Henry, and George Mason, 9 were perhaps
the decisive influence in framing First Amendment religious
protections. The Virginia experience resonated especially strongly in
the early Establishment Clause jurisprudence of the Court."' We might
say an originalism of jurisprudence followed an influential strand of
originalist history.
For Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, Enlightenment ideals
drove their version of civic republicanism. "' They advocated
separation of church and state as the proper institutional relationship." 2
For Jefferson, deeply influenced by French thought,"3 separation was
105. SeeEverson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
106. Seeid at 15-16, 18, 28, 31-32.
107. Id. at 17-18.
108. SeeAdams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1582-83.
109. Seeid at 1572.
110. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437 (1961); Everson, 330 U.S. at
11-13; see also Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1572 n.54 (collecting authorities).
Today, the Court of the Vinson-Warren era is roundly criticized for looking at history too
cursorily, considering only this Virginia experience. See, e.g., Michael W McConnell,
Establishmentand Disestablishmentat the Founding,PartI Establishment of Religion, 44
WM. & MARY L. REv 2105, 2108-09 (2003).
111. SeeAdams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1583-87.
112. Seeid
113. See id. at 1584. Jefferson served the United States as minister to France from
1785-1789. Id. Thomas Paine, author of the leading revolutionary tract, Common Sense
(1776), was also a confirmed Francophile. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, reprintedin
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mainly a strategy to protect the fragility of the experiment in civic
republicanism, and perhaps an argument for secularism. "' For
Madison, separation was designed to protect politics and religion;
Madison believed both in the value of the civic-republican experiment
and the purity and preciousness of religion."5 Jefferson and Madison
were probably the main architects of the First Amendment religious
guarantees."6
Religious evangelicals (most prominently Baptists) aligned
themselves with Enlightenment separatists to support separation of

THOMAS PAINE: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 3 (Harry Hayden Clark ed., rev. ed. Am.
Century Series 1965) (1944). Paine aided the French in drafting the famous Declarationof
Rights ofMan andt1e Citizen (1789), which also secured religious freedoms. See Adams &
Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1584. Paine was an extreme separatist, once observing that the
union of church and state bred "a sort of mule-animal, capable only of destroying, and not of
breeding up.' THOMAS PAINE, TE RIGHTS OF MAN (pt. 1) 56 (Heritage Press 1961) (1791).
Other civic republicans were alarmed by the excesses of the French Revolution and
sought to dampen the passion for excessive liberty. One infamous measure taken was the
Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, ostensibly used to restrict the French ideology, but which the
administration of John Adams used to jail political opponents. See Francis Cardinal George,
Civil Liberties vs. National Security The Enduring Tension, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs &
PUB. POL'Y 219, 222 n.8 (2005); Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 577.
For other classifications of early influences on the First Amendment religious
protections, see Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1583-95 (distinguishing between
separatists, political centrists, and pietistic separatists); Witte, supia note 32, at 377-88
(distinguishing between Puritan, evangelical enlightenment, and civic-republican views).
114. Jefferson's famous statement of the "wall of separation" is drawn from his letter
to Nehemiah Dodge and others. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah
Dodge and Others, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of
Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984); see also Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 102 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) ("[A] perfect separation
between ecclesiastical and civil matters" is the best course to ensure that "religion [and
government] will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together."). Madison,
however, was not always so absolute in his view of separatism. He also spoke of a wavering
"line of separation between the rights of religion and the Civil authority" in certain
"unessentials" of religion. Letter from James Madison to Rev. [Jasper] Adams (1832), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 484, 487 [hereinafter Madison's Letter to Rev.
Adams]. In later life, Madison returned to a view of complete separation of church and state.
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1587.
115. See Witte, supranote 32, at 377-78.
116. See Everson Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947) (describing and observing
the leading role played by Jefferson and Madison in formulating the values and drafting the
religious protections of the First Amendment); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878) (discussing the adoption of the First Amendment). It is hard to determine
who actually drafted the First Amendment, although most people credit Madison. SeeAdams
& Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1581. They credit him for good reason: Madison sponsored
the Bill of Rights as part of the compromise in Virginia leading to the state's ratification of
the Constitution, and he then labored mightily to craft the Bill of Rights to achieve consensus.
SeeWallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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church and state."7 In part, their motivation included their own selfinterest and the interest of the community."8 As minorities, Baptists

were worried that dominant political and religious power would inhibit
them and other similarly situated groups.' 9 Separation of church and
state was a way to get the state out of their-and other minorities'way.120
These evangelicals echoed the essential teaching of Roger
Williams, America's original religious thinker, that separation of
church and state served the interests of each institution best by
protecting the purity and integrity of each against the inevitable2
tensions arising from one infringing on the domain of the other. '
Roger Williams, after all, was the original source for the "wall of
separation" metaphor.' 2 Many people view the evangelicals as
advocating separation of church and state in order to protect the purity
of religion as a voluntary, noncoerced exercise, but much evangelical
thought was deeper than that, arguing also for political independence
and a theory of the state.'23
The separationist argument, at heart, asserts that religion is a
private, voluntary matter between only people and God.' There can
be no intrusion into this inviolate sphere of a person's spirit.'25 Official
support of religion only leads to its corruption, as either government
tries to control religion or religion tries to comport itself to curry favor
with government.'26 Moreover, entangling government in religion, or
religion in government, leads to great divisiveness in society as
religion or its particular sects will inevitably be favored or disfavored
in official policies. This leads to overconfidence or arrogance in those
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Witte, supm note 32, at 381-82.
See id.
See id
Seeid
Seeidat 381.
See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams' Gift: Religious Freedom in America, 4
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 425, 427 (1999) (citing Roger Williams, Mr. Cottons Letter
Lately Printed, Examined and Answered (1644), repintedin I THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
ROGER WILLIAMS 313, 392 (Perry Miller ed., 1963)). It is possible Jefferson used the wall of

separation metaphor to converse in the language of the Baptists, who were well acquainted
with Williams's metaphor. See Witte, supa note 32, at 400 n.144.

123.

See, e.g., Eberle, supanote 122, at 456-60.

124.
125.

SeeWitte, supa note 32, at 399-400.
Seeid

126.

"[E]xperience

witnesseth

that

ecclesiastical

establishments,

instead

of

maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation... [leading to]

pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition,
bigotry and persecution." Letter from Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supa note
82, at 12.
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favored and hostility and rejection in those disfavored, whether
religious or not.' 27 Thus, evangelicals, like Enlightenment civic
republicans,'28 desired that religious bodies be free from state favors
like "tax exemptions, civil immunities, property donations, and other
forms of state support for the church."''29 The Baptist minister John
Leland, echoing John Locke, put the matter bluntly: "'The
notion of a
30
Christian commonwealth should be exploded forever."

Now, this experiment in separationism resonates with most
Americans, positively or negatively. For it was the philosophy of
separationism that marked the Court's first entr6e into policing the
border between church and state, following Jefferson's metaphor of a
"wall of separation."'3 ' Much of Establishment Clause law that has
followed, such as the two recent Ten Commandment cases, has been a
battle over whether a "wall of separation" is the proper rubric within
which to view church-state relations.'32
The American experiment in separationism was unique, being the
first of its kind in the world, with Roger William's experiment in
Providence colony, in 1638, being the very first.' Even today, there
are few experiments in strict separation of church and state. France'34
and Turkey'35 provide two other notable experiments.
127. See Witte, supra note 32, at 399-400.
128. As Madison observed: "[A] perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil
matters [is best for] religion [and government which] will both exist in greater purity, the less
they are mixed together." Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 114,
at 102. Madison's two main themes were separation of church and state, as mentioned, and
that a multiplicity of religious sects, as a multiplicity of interests, is the best guard against
faction, which could thereby better preserve liberty. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James
Madison).
129. See Witte, supra note 32, at 382. However, some evangelicals did not object to
some state support of religion. Isacc Backus, for example, was not against "Sabbath laws,
teaching Calvinistic doctrine in the public schools, proscribing blasphemy, and conducting
official days of fasting and prayer." Adams & Emmerich, supm note 32, at 1593.
130.

JoIN

LELAND, THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 118 (New York,

G.W. Wood 1845), cited in Witte, supra note 32, at 382. As recounted by Professor Feldman,
Locke said: '.[T]here is absolutely no such thing, under the Gospel, as a Christian
commonwealth.' Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.YU.L. REv. 346, 387 (2002) (citing LOCKE, supranote81, at 40).
131. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
132. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU of
Ky., 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005).
133. See Eberle, supa note 122, at 449.
134. 1958 CONST. art. 2 (Fr.) ("La France est une Re'publique indivisible, laique,
d6mocratique et sociale.' ["France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social
Republic."]).
135. TuRK. CONST. art. 24.
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But separationism was not the only early American philosophy to
demarcate church-state relations. The Puritan tradition advocated
separation of church and state in institutional matters so that the
internal governance of church and state could be preserved.'3 6 But
Puritans also advocated cooperation between church and state to aid
religion and support the State. 13 7 Under Puritanism, government could
support religious education, pay the salaries of clergy, provide land to
churches, grant tax exemptions to religious organizations, and provide
other aid. 38 Of course, only Christian churches-primarily the
Congregational Church (the successor to the Puritans)-received such
state benevolence.' 9 Church officials, in turn, aided the state by
hosting town assemblies, political rallies, and educational instructions,
acting as libraries, "preaching obedience to the authorities," and more
general encouragement of right and lawful conduct in citizens.'4 °
This Puritan tradition was carried forward by other prominent
American civic republicans, such as George Washington, John Adams,
Of course,
Samuel Adams, Oliver Ellsworth, and James Wilson.'
these accommodationist civic republicans had elements in common
They
with their Enlightenment and evangelical counterparts.
advocated liberty of conscience for all and free exercise of religion,
encouraged a plurality of religions, and discouraged "political
intrusions on religion that rose to the level of religious
establishment."'4 2 These sets of values-free conscience, free exercise,
pluralism, separationism, disestablishment, and equality-are what we

136. See Witte, supra note 32, at 378-79. Puritans conceived church and state as "two
seats of Godly authority in the community." Id at 379. The role of the church is to tend to
matters spiritual; the role of the state is to maintain peace and order. See id.
Church officials were prohibited from holding political office, serving on juries,
interfering in governmental affairs, endorsing political candidates, or censuring the
official conduct of a statesmen. Political officials, in turn, were prohibited from
holding ministerial office, interfering in internal ecclesiastical government,
performing sacerdotal functions of clergy, or censuring the official conduct of a
cleric.
Id.
137. See id
138. Id at 379-80.
139. Seeid
140. Id.at 380.
141. Id at 385-86. Puritan thought "provided the moral and religious background of
fully 75 percent of the people who declared their independence in 1776." At.LSTROM, supra
note 2, at 124.
142. Witte, supm note 32, at 386.
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might call a core of "'essential rights and liberties of [religion].' ' 43
But in contrast to their Enlightenment counterparts, they desired and
encouraged a common religious ethic.1 44 George Washington, for
example, observed that "Religion and Morality are the essential pillars
of Civil society."'' 4 5 Religion promotes morality, and morality is
important to the teaching of right conduct in citizens of a democracy,
who, after all, are counted on more for civic virtue and proper
governance than other forms of political organization.4 6 If nothing
else, religion was valued for its utility in inculcating proper conduct.
This ideal seems to be the one animating these more centrist civic
republicans.
Accommodationist civic republicans thus tolerated official
support and accommodation of religion, unlike their separationist
contemporaries. 147 They "endorsed tax exemptions for church
properties and tax support for religious schools, charities, and
143. Id. at 388 (quoting ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF
PROTESTANTS: A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR THE LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, AND THE RIGHT OF
PRIVATE JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF RELIGION, WITHOUT ANY CONTROUL FROM HUMAN

AUTHORITY (1744)). James Madison spoke similarly. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 784 (Joseph
Gales, Sr. ed., 1834).
144. Witte, supra note 32, at 386. The civic-republican religious ethic was, of course,
less stringent and intolerant as compared with the Puritan ethic. Dissenters from Puritan
ideology, such as Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson from Massachusetts Bay, were
banished. See Eberle, supm note 1,at 320.
145. Letter from George Washington to the Clergy of Different Denominations
Residing in and Near the City of Philadelphia (Mar. 3, 1797), in 35 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 416 (John

C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931). Washington's Farewell Address of September 17, 1796, was
another famous declaration of this thought: "'Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to
political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man
claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human
happiness-these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens."' George Washington,
President of the United States, Farewell Address to the People of the United States (Sept. 17,
1796), quoted in Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1605. John Adams similarly
observed: "[W]e have no government armed with power capable of contending with human
passions unbridled by morality and religion." Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the
First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 229 (Charles Francis

Adams ed., 1854). In 1798, Adams observed: "Our Constitution was made only for a moral
and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other." Id
146. As Madison observed in The Federalist Number 55:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of
circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which
justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government
presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison).

147. See Witte, supra note 32, at 386-87.
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missionaries; donations of public lands to religious organizations; and
criminal protections against blasphemy, sacrilege, and interruption of
religious services."1 '8 In practice, these official favors were accorded
only to Protestants; "Quakers, Catholics, and the few Jewish groups
about were routinely excluded."' 9 They also favored "government
appointment of legislative and military chaplains, government
sponsorship of general religious education and organization, and
government enforcement of a religiously based morality through
positive law.""'5 Massachusetts was the prime example of this more
accommodationist approach.'"' The Supreme Court has recognized
some of this early history in sustaining the constitutionality of opening
legislative sessions with a state-paid chaplain,'52 tax exemptions for
churches,153 and establishing Sunday as a uniform day of rest.'" There
is, in fact, much historical work arguing that the First Amendment
supports such an accommodationist approach.'55
However, the historical record discloses an important
qualification attached to state support of religion. By the end of the
eighteenth century, "almost no one in America thought that
government legitimately could compel taxes for religious purposes
without offering some possibility of formally opting out of the tax."'56
148. Id. at 387. "[T]he Continental Congress authorized legislative and military
chaplains, provided for the importation of Bibles, and proclaimed days of thanksgiving,
prayer, and fasting." Adams & Emmerich, supm note 32, at 1571. Thomas Jefferson, as
President, refused to render a Thanksgiving Proclamation or any official acknowledgment of
religion, believing those to be contrary to the First Amendment. See Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 623 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). As President, James Madison buckled under
the political pressure of the War of 1812 and rendered several Thanksgiving Proclamations,
which he later regretted and disavowed. See id at 623-26; Adams & Emmerich, supa note
32, at 1585, 1587.
149. Witte, supm note 32, at 387.
150. Id.at 386.
151. See id at 387.
152. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
153. Walz v.Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 677-80 (1970).
154. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 451-52 (1961).
155. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Madison and other members of Congress saw the First Amendment as
prohibiting the establishment of a national religion and perhaps the preference of one
religious sect over another, but not as requiring the government's neutrality between religion
and nonreligion); Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1579 n.88 (collecting authorities).
156. Feldman, supra note 130, at 351. It was difficult, however, to obtain a waiver in
practice, resulting in many taxpayers being taxed against their will. Justice Jackson adopted
this position-finding unconstitutional forced taxation without waiver-in his dissent in
Everson. See 330 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Douglas Laycock,
'Nonpreferential"Aidto Religion: A False Claim About OnginalIntent, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 875, 900-01 (1986) (discussing problems in the application of the tax waiver).
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Freedom from compulsion, including forced taxation, was an essence
of liberty of conscience. It was less clear whether taxes could be
collected so that people could designate the church of their choice that
they wanted to support.5 7
Thus, if we were following a constitutional theory of originalism,
Justice Scalia is quite right to observe that "[w]ith respect to public
acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our
Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits ...
disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it
permits the disregard of devout atheists."' 58 Justice Story captured this
sentiment by famously (or infamously) observing that the
Establishment Clause was designed "not to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects."' 59 In
fact, Justice Story and others of the nineteenth century commonly
thought that "'Christianity is a part of the common law."" 6 Yet, if we
were being true to originalism, we would have to ask: Would we
tolerate such overt, invidious discrimination as was commonly
practiced at the time?
So, as we assess the Puritan-influenced component of American
religious history, we can see that it bears some striking resemblances to
German history. Elements of both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
American and German history preferred Christianity to other religions,
with both tending to prefer Protestantism over contrary Christian belief
systems, and Christianity over non-Christian belief systems. There
157. See Feldman, supra note 130, at 416. George Washington, for example, thought
that compelled taxation to support a church of a person's choice was compatible with
freedom of conscience, "so long as no one was obligated to support a religion with which he
disagreed." Id at 394 n.270.
158. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2753 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing further that George Washington's Thanksgiving Proclamation and the
Ten Commandments are monotheistic, embracing Christianity, Judaism, and Islam). But see
id at 2744-45 (majority opinion) ("[T]he dissent says that the deity the Framers had in mind
was the God of monotheism, with the consequence that government may espouse a tenet of
traditional monotheism. This is truly a remarkable view.").
159. ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 13 (1988) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 629 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 5th ed.
1891) (emphasis omitted)). Chief Justice John Marshall "also believed that religion was

essential for the survival of the republic," and noted the close relationship between
Christianity and the United States. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1590.
160. See Witte, supra note 32, at 407. "Story disputed Jefferson's contention that
Christianity was not part of the common law,' observing that Christianity offered "'the great
basis, on which [the republic] must rest for its support and permanence."' Adams &
Emmerich, supranote 32, at 1590 (quoting STORY, supra note 159, at 629).
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was overt discrimination against other sects and belief systems. Both
countries effectively evidenced de facto state establishments of religion
in certain states. Some states established Christianity, and others
specifically established Protestantism. A clear difference between
American and German history is that some states in early America also
adhered to a different strand of church-state relations: separationism.
Rhode Island was the first experiment in separationism,'6 ' and the
Virginia experience in separationism was, as previously noted, perhaps
the decisive influence in framing the First Amendment. With this look
at the countries' religious history, let us now evaluate their approach to
public support of religious education.
IV

PUBLIC SUPPORT OF RELIGION IN GERMAN SCHOOLS

The deep tradition of church sponsorship of learning is a major
reason why the traditional form of school in Germany was a
confessional school, which was designed to teach religion alongside
core secular topics. 62' The movement away from confessional schools
began with the liberal movement of the nineteenth century, inspired by
the French Revolution, which occurred mainly in southern areas like
the

southwestern

state

of Baden.

163

The

nineteenth-century

liberalization of parts of Germany led to a process of secularization
throughout society, including the school system.'" In place of
confessional schools, education was redesigned to take the form of
"open" community schools, which sought to minimize religious
influence in the schools by opening students' minds to a range of
influences, religious and otherwise, along more Enlightenment ways.' 5
The open community school (an interdenominational school with a
distinct Christian orientation presenting a range of religious and
ideological views) thereby became the main model for schools in
Germany. The Weimar Constitution essentially confirmed this school
arrangement, which the Basic Law ratified as well.' 6
Further confirmation of the Christian interdenominational
community school as a general model for German schools came to the
fore in a series of important rulings by the Constitutional Court, all
161. SeeEberle, supranote 122, at 449.
162. SeeBVerfG Dec. 17, 1975, 41 BVerfGE 29 (57) (Baden-WirttembergChn'stian
Cmty. Sch. Case).
163. SeeMuehlhoff, supa note 19, at 457.
164. ERNST CHRISTIAN HELMREICH, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN GERMAN SCHOOLS: AN
HISTORICAL APPROACH 37-41 (1959).
165. See BVerfGE 41, 29 (57) (Baden- Wirttemberg Chn'stian Cmr. Sch. Case).
166. SeeGG arts. 4, 7(3), 140.

2006]

RELIGIONIN THE CLASSROOM

issued on the same day. While we might say that a Christian
interdenominational community school is the general type of school
present in Germany, there is, of course, variation in the characteristics
of schools in different regions of Germany, given that each Land
determines its own educational policy.'67 Three cases we now consider
reflect this variation: Baden-Wiirttemberg Christan Community
School Case,'68 Bavarian Christan Commumity School Case,'9 and
North-Rhem Wesiphalia Chnrstian Community School Case.70 We
will primarily consider the Baden- Wiirttemberg Christan Community
School Case,the main case.
A.

Baden-Wiirttemberg Christian Community School Case

The Christian community school at the heart of the case
emphasized the Christian roots of German and European society, but
strictly limited teaching of religion as gospel to religion classes. 7' In
religion class, authorities from the major religions--Catholicism,
Lutheranism, or other Protestantism-select teachers and materials to
instruct in their faith 72 In this sense, the school is interdenomina-7
tional. Recently, Islam has achieved a toehold to do the same.11
Religion class is a regular and required part of the school curriculum.' 4
Parents (or students when they reach ages of fourteen or sixteen)
decide which religious instruction to receive.'75 They can also decide
to receive no religious instruction and be relieved from the
requirement. 76 The school is also interdenominational in that there
must be a provision for a format for presentation of a range of religious
and ideological views. 7 7 Outside of religion class, Christianity can
only be mentioned as an historical or cultural force, but not as a chosen
167.

Seeid.art. 7(1).

168.

BVerfGE 41,29.

169. BVerfG Dec. 17, 1975, 41 BVerfGE 65 (Bavarian ChstitanCmty Sch. Case).
170. BVerfG Dec. 17, 1975, 41 BVerfGE 88 (N.-Rhein Westphalia Christian Cmty
Sch. Case).
171. Article 7 codifies this arrangement of the Weimar era. See GG art. 7(3).
172. SeeMuehlhoff, supmanote 19, at458.
173. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Feb. 23,
2005, 9 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE], available at

http://www.bundesverwaltungsgericht.de (holding that the teaching of Islam in North-Rhein
Westphalia cannot be rejected out of hand because Islam is not organized as a legal

corporation, as is the usual case, and finding further proceedings necessary to determine
whether Islam has the characteristics necessary to qualify as a legal religious order).
174. SeeGG art. 7(3).
175. Id.; KMMERS, supranote 12, at471.
176. SeeGGart.7(2).
177. SeeMuehlhoff, supmanote 19, at458.
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tenet of faith. 78' All classes, apart from religion, are shared commonly
by students, the ideal of the nineteenth-century liberal experiment. '
There can be other forms of school as well, as determined by the
community. The alternatives to a Christian community school are a
confessional, religious school (as formerly practiced widely in
Germany) or a secular, nonreligious school, which is quite rare outside
of Bremen, Berlin, and Brandenburg.'80 Confessional schools are most
popular in more religious areas of Germany. In the German states of
Bremen, Berlin, and Brandenburg, the predominant school form is
secular, not Christian. 8 '
Christian community schools did not resolve all constitutional
issues, despite the long-standing school practice. The question in the
Baden-Wiirttemberg Chnstian Community School Case was a recent
Baden-Wiirttemberg law that unified the school form in the state, but
which had the effect of changing the form of community school in
Baden to a distinctly more Christian orientation.'82 A father filed a
constitutional complaint that the change in school to a more Christian
orientation violated his Article 4 free exercise and Article 6 parental
rights because it would be harder for him to raise his child in a
nonreligious environment, as he desired.' 3 Of course, under Article 7
of the Basic Law, it was the province of the Land legislature to
determine the appropriate form of school for the region, upon taking
into consideration the full range of varied interests at stake.'8 4 Still,

only the Constitutional Court could determine the permissible
circumference of constitutionality within which the legislature could
work, which it proceeded to do. The Court found the complaint
unfounded, which had the effect of confirming the constitutionality of
a Christian community school.' 5
The constitutional issues are complicated, reflecting the
principles of the German constitutional order. From the standpoint of
the complaining parent, he could allege violations of his Article 4 free
exercise rights (interference with his choice or religion or ideology)
178. See id at 457.
179. See BVerfG Dec. 17, 1975, 41 BVerfGE 29 (58) (Baden-WiirttembergChistian
Cmty Sch. Case).
180. See Muehihoff, supranote 19, at 456.
181. For a discussion of the role of religion in schools in Bremen, Berlin, and
Brandenburg, see infra text accompanying notes 222-228.
182. BVerfGE 41,29(36) (Baden-WiirttembergChr'stian Cmty Sch. Case).
183. Id.at (44). His wife did not join in the complaint. Id
184. GG art. 7; BVerfGE 41, 29 (4648) (Baden-Wiirttemberg Chistian Cmty. Sch.
Case).
185. BVerfGE 41,29 (44) (Baden-Wi&temberg Cth'stianCmty. Sch. Case).
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and his Article 6 parental rights (interference with his right to raise his
child according to desired religious or ideological views). 86 However,
his assertion of rights could only go so far. In the German
constitutional order, rights' holders are not isolated individuals or, as is
sometimes the case in American law, lone rangers. Instead, German
rights' holders operate within a social community that instills values
and responsibilities in its members. This had immediate consequences
in the case. For at issue, according to the Constitutional Court, were
not only the rights of the complaining parent, but the same set of
religious and parental rights for other parents as well who might want a
school to have a more distinctly Christian orientation or might be quite
satisfied with the form of the school as it is.'87 It is fair to say that no
parent can demand a certain kind of school.'
Further, the German conception of religious rights is different
than the American conception, reflecting more of an orientation of
development and assertion of personality rather than mere exercise of
claims and interests. There is an inner dimension to a person's
religious rights that captures matters of faith and belief, as in the
United States. But there is also an outer dimension to these rights that
facilitates the ability of a person to practice outwardly chosen faith. 9
The outer dimension to German religious rights are far more
pronounced than in American law, especially with the movement from
Sherbert v Verne?90 to Employment Division, Departmentof Human
Resources v Smith. 19' The German movement toward holistic
personhood has its roots in the architectonic principle of human
dignity and the accompanying free unfolding of personality that
animates the German constitutional order.
The transcendent

186. Id at (36-37).
187. Id at (50).
188. Idat (46).
189. Belief and freedom of faith encompass not only the inner freedom to believe or
not believe, but also the outer freedom to manifest belief in the world, to confess, and to
spread the word. Included also is the right of the individual to orient his whole life according
to his inner conviction. In this sense, Article 4, section 1, and Article 2 of the Weimar
Constitution comprise not only defensive rights, which prohibit the state from entering the
highly personal area of individuality, but also endow a positive sense, that guarantees room
for the active conviction of faith and the realization of the autonomous personality in the
religious or ideological arena. Id at (49).
190. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (noting that free exercise claims are judged by the courts
under conventional strict scrutiny analysis).
191. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (noting that free exercise claims are judged not by strict
scrutiny but by inquiry into whether law in effect is generally applicable and neutral). For
discussion of this difference, see Eberle, supm note 15, at 1023.
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dimension of human personality captured by religion and ideology is
part of the essence of being human.
The battle among competing parents is, as we might imagine,
somewhat of a free-for-all, as any community of parents is likely to
involve differing views as to the degree of religion desired in the
community school. Only a compromise among contending views can
achieve some equilibrium to this quandary. This is essentially what the
Constitutional Court instructed.'92
The struggle, moreover, was not just among contending parents;
the state had supervisory duties over education as well.'93 The positive
duties of the state flow from the positive nature of the German
constitutional order, which bestows both rights and duties on official
authority to manifest the core values of the Basic Law.'94
Following the devolution principle applicable to education, the
Constitutional Court determined quite naturally that the Land
legislature had the ultimate authority to fix the nature of religious
education, upon taking into consideration the wide ranges of religious
and educational matters at issue in such a crucial decision." The
choice of school form appropriate for the community, however, was to
be determined by the community, in accord with Landlaw. Deference
to local authority over schools is, as in the United States, attributable to
federalism principles. Because of federalism, there can be no unified
school in Germany.
As instructed by the Court, the legislature was obligated to
consider relevant values of the Basic Law, including parental rights
and, most importantly, children's welfare.'96 Under German law, the
legislative judgment would involve concordance (Konkordan-),
seeking an equilibrium to balance the contending rights and interests.'97
Inevitably, this will be a compromise.
Yet, the legislative judgment cannot be simply the product of
majority vote. If it were, the majority would always get its way.

192. BVerfGE 41, 29 (50) (Baden-Wirttemberg Chnsan Cmty Sch. Case) (holding
that in today's pluralistic society, it is virtually impossible that any one parent can exercise
religious rights without restriction; one parent's exercise of rights is likely to be limited by
other parents' exercise of the same rights; thus, communities must search for a compromise
addressing all views).
193. See GG arts. 6(2), 7(1).
194. Seeid arts. 1(1), 20(2).
195. See id art. 28(2) (outlining a Lands right to regulate local affairs); BVerfGE 41,
29 (37) (Baden- WirttembergChristianCmty Sch. Case).
196. BVerfGE 41, 29 (47) (Baden-WiirttembergChristianCmty Sch. Case).
197. Id at(50-51).

2006]

RELIGIONIN THE CLASSROOM

Special regard must also be given to minority views.'98 A careful look
at the constitutional principles set down by the Court provides insight
into the German solution of how to address religion in common
schools.
In setting out guidelines governing the role religion can play in
the Christian community school, the Constitutional Court emphasized
the need to minimize any coercion of conscience. 9 First, any religious
instruction must be done with a minimum of forced persuasion; there
can be no insistence on the truth of Christianity.2" Second, there can
be no religious instruction or proselytization in school except in
religion class.2"' Students who desire not to participate in religion class
must be excused from doing so as a matter of free exercise of
conscience.0 2 Third, outside of religion class, Christianity, as the
dominant religion, can only be referred to as an historical or cultural
force, not as religious doctrine." 3 The more privileged position of
Christianity reflects its dominance as a cultural force, not its truth as
doctrine.0" Fourth, schools must be open and tolerant of other
beliefs."5 The role of the school is to offer a variety of religious and
ideological perspectives as a forum for learning.' There can be no
discrimination against other religious or ideological views.0 7 In the
view of the court, these constraints on the role religion plays in
common schools should afford parents adequate room to impart or
inculcate religious and ideological views to their children as they deem
fit, without coercion of conscience. 8
For those parents yet unhappy with this arrangement for their
children, further options are available. First, a child may be excused
from religious class.0 " Second, a child can attend a secular school in
communities where that option is available.' Third, where no secular
schools are available, a child can attend a private school, secular or

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.at (47-48).
Id. at (54).
Id.at (51).
Id. at (51-52).
Id.
Id. at (52).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at (51-52).
Id. at (45).
Id.
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religious, according to choice.2 ' We can thus see that a Land is
obligated to provide parents and students a wide range of religious and
ideological opportunities.
Notable about the German community school model is its
transparently Christian orientation, reflective of the predominant
Christian roots of the society. Yet, the role of religion is more
constrained than the model would suggest. Religious instruction or
indoctrination can only occur in religion class for those freely willing
to participate. Religion is a matter of choice, not obligation. Apart
from religion class, Christianity can only be mentioned as a cultural
force, not as a religious force. '2 In this regard, Christianity is to be
treated like any other belief system under a school that is designed to
be open to and tolerant of all views. In this aspect, the state acts
somewhat neutrally, not taking sides on religious views and, instead,
offering the school as a forum for the different communities of faith to
teach their tenets.
B.

Bavarian Christian Community School Case

The prohibition on teaching religious tenets in schools was put to
the test in the Bavaian Christian Community School Case,"3 which
involved an accord reached by Roman Catholic and Lutheran churches
over the teaching of fundamental Christian gospel, such as the Ten
Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Apostolic and Nicene
creeds." ' The churches had published their pedagogical inclinations in
their official publications.: ' Catholic and Lutheran sets of parents
unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the practice because they believed this
would convert the Bavarian school from an interdenominational school
to a confessional one.2 6
The Court attributed the choice of introducing this more
distinctly Christian program to the churches themselves, and not the
state." 7 Thus, the Court had no constitutional objections. 18
211. Id These options were part of the Weimar compromise that constitutionalized
much of the German church-state relationship.
212. "The approval of Christianity is attributable to acknowledgment of its role as
dominant cultural and educational forces, not as to the truth of its belief system...." Id. at

(64).
213.

BVerfG Dec. 17,1975,41 BVerfGE 65.

214. Id. at (70).
215. Id.at (68-70).
216. Id at (71, 77).
217. Id. at (85).
218.

Id.
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The guidelines were published in church papers, not official
ones. 29 The guidelines were only helpful aids; they were not binding
on the schools or the state.22° Moreover, any overt confrontation with
Christianity can be dealt with by the fundamental constitutional norms
announced in Baden- WViirttemberg ChtistianCommuniiy School Case.
noncoercion, toleration, and nondiscrimination.22 ' Concretely, this
meant that the community school had to allow presentation of other
religious and ideological views as well, unlike a confessional school.
No person could be made to feel isolated." The Bavarian choice
illustrates the wide options of school form available under German
federalism. " ' Communities can reformat schools along distinctly more
religious lines if there is a consensus to do so, as they can also do the
same along more secular lines.
Viewed from afar, it would seem the complaining parents had a
point. Orientation of education according to fundamental Christian
teachings would seem to push, if not cross, the line from secular
Christian orientation to religious indoctrination. It seemed that the
schools did reformat along distinctly more Christian lines, quite likely
crossing the neutrality border. There can be no doubt that German
public schools allow more overt religious doctrine and influence than
American public schools.
C

Brandenburg Cases

Eastern regions of Germany that were formerly under Soviet
occupation and then became part of the German Democratic Republic
are, not surprisingly, distinctly less religious than their counterparts
who belonged to the Federal Republic of Germany before
unification." ' The eastern states tended to carry over the more

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at (85-86).
222. Id at (83).

223. The Court noted that a community could decide to have even a confessional
school, as long as provisions-likely taking the form of a separate school-were made for
dissenters. Id. at (86). However, the Court also decided, on the same day, that no parent can
demand a confessional school.

See BVerfG Dec. 17, 1975, 41 BVerfGE 88 (N-Rheim

Westphalia Chisian Cmty Sch. Case). Thus, the cases hold that no parent can demand a
certain form of religious school, whether more religious (North-Rhein Westphalia Christian
Community School Case) or more secular (Baden-Wiirttemberg Chnistian Community
School Case). Yet, it seems fair to observe that communities can tilt schools along more
secular or sectarian lines.
224. See Wuerth, supra note 35, at 1152-54.
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distinctly antireligious orientation when they joined the reunited
Federal Republic.225
These issues came to the fore in the state of Brandenburg, where
the Land legislature introduced an ethics and religion course as a
substitute for normal religious instruction, which was the standard
course in the school curriculum. 26 One major difference was that the
ethics and religion course would not be taught or organized by the
religions, as is normally the case in the German schools. 7 This met
with stiff resistance from the churches, who felt threatened by and
displeased with the antireligious orientation of the instruction and
asserted their authority as guardians of the faith in an attempt to
preserve the domain of the believers. 28 But in a novel solution, the
parties were able to bury their hatchets and reach agreement, which the
Constitutional Court supervised as an arbitration settlement, itself a
highly novel use of judicial authority.2 9
The terms of the agreement mirrored in reverse the constitutional
solution reached in the trio of Chisian Community School Cases.
The ethics and religion class could be taught as a regular part of the
school curriculum, but students who did not wish to take part had the
right to be excused, a necessary condition of freedom from coercion of
conscience.23 ° Students desiring to take religious instruction, as more
common in other German Lfinder, could do so as well, provided there
was a minimum of twelve students willing to do so.2 1 The
Brandenburg nonreligious school curriculum is similar to those in
place in the German Linder of Berlin and Bremen and could be
instituted because of federalism principles that allow Lihderto fix the
content of their school curriculum.
What we see then as we turn to the United States for an
evaluation of state support of religion in American schools is that the
German model is very decentralized, with each Land determining the
school curriculum. The idea of local control over education resonates
225. See id
226. BVerfG Oct. 31, 2002, 106 BVerfGE 210 (211-15) (BrandenburgIII).
227. Id.
228. Id. at (211).
229. The issue was contentious enough to go before the Constitutional Court four
times. Each time the Court confirmed the arbitration settlement, despite the challenges to
introduction of the course. Id.; BVerfG July 28, 2002, 1 Verfahren fiber den Erlass einer
einstweiligen Anordnung [BvQ] 25/02 (Brandenburg III); BVerfG, Apr. 23, 2002, 105
BVerfGE 235 (Brandenburg I); BVerfG, June 26, 2001, 104 BVerfGE 305 (308)
(Brandenburg).
230. BVerfGE 104, 305 (308) (BrandenburgI).
231. See id at (308).
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in both countries. The Christian community school is the norm, but
we have also observed how three German states are distinctly
nonreligious, including the major population center, Berlin. Schools
containing religion or ethics as a normal part of the curriculum must
accommodate dissenters-those students choosing not to participateby excusing them from required attendance in those classes and, upon
request, reasonably creating options more suitable to their religious or
ideological beliefs. Further, in Christian community schools, teaching
of religion must be restricted to religion class, and Christianity may be
referred to outside of religion class only as a cultural or historical, but
not religious, force. Finally, there can be no discrimination against
other religious or ideological views. In these respects, we can see that
German doctrine is following its own version of state neutrality,
nondiscrimination, and noncoercion. How these German doctrines
compare to American doctrines is our next topic.
V

PUBLIC SUPPORT OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS

A.

PublicSchools

It is strange, in a sense, to speak of public support of -religion in
American schools in the twenty-first century. With the dawn of
modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 1947 case Everson v
Board of Education launched the idea of separation of church and
state, with mixed effect in Supreme Court jurisprudence, but with deep
effect in the American psyche."2 For some time in the modem age
marked by Everson, and even today, the Court and Americans believed
in a model of separation of church and state.233 One clear principle of
232. See 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church
and State."' (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 94 U.S. 145, 164 (1878))). The Everson
Court unanimously articulated a distinctly separationist approach to the Establishment
Clause, although the Justices split five-to-four over application of separationist philosophy to
the issue under review. Id. The Court upheld provision of state-supported bussing of
Catholic students on the ground that provision of bussing was a neutral service, analogous to
police and fire protection. Id. at 17-18. The dissent disagreed, finding this to be a violation
of separation of church and state under a more absolutist application of this principle. Id. at
63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Through the course of the Warren Court and into the early
Burger Court, the Court understood the Establishment Clause to dictate separation of church
and state, although application of the principle yielded mixed results, sometimes prohibiting
state aid of religion, sometimes supporting state aid of religion. Compare Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (holding that a supplement paid to teachers in nonpublic
schools and a reimbursement for purchases for nonpublic schools were unconstitutional),
with Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676, 680 (1970) (holding that property tax
exemptions to religious organizations was constitutional).
233. SeeEberle, supranote 120, at 478-79.
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separationist philosophy is that there can be no public support of
religious instruction in schools."' Until 1983, the Court had never
sustained any public support for religious instruction, being careful to
approve state support for religion only over secular matters such as the
lending of secular text books.2 35 Because the public school is the
forum for inculcation of democratic and constitutional values,
adherence to separationism, as influenced by Enlightenment tradition,
made sense as a plausible interpretation of constitutional text.
Most American students attend public schools, where religious
instruction does not occur as part of the public school curriculum, as is3
the norm in German schools. A case like Epperson v Arkansa 1
would appear to place an insurmountable roadblock to public support
for religious instruction in public schools. In Epperson,the Court held
unconstitutional an Arkansas statute that "prohibit[ed] the teaching in
its public schools and universities of the theory that man evolved from
other species [i.e., evolution]" because it was "tailored to the principles
or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma."2" ' The closest the
Court has come to allowing religious instruction in public schools
during the school day are time-release programs for religious
131
instruction, which must occur off public school premises.
With respect to religious instruction in public schools, it seems
fair to conclude that Germany and the United States diverge. The
standard German model allows religion to be taught as a regular part
of the school curriculum, in contrast to the United States. There are, of
234. See id.
235. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1968) (finding it permissible to lend
textbooks on secular topics). The pathbreaking case was Mueller v Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 39496 (1983), in which the Court sustained a Minnesota state tax deduction for tuition, textbook,
and transportation expenses, ninety-six percent of the benefits of which went to religious
schools.
236. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
237. Id at 98, 106; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987)
(invalidating a Louisiana statute requiring teaching of "creation science" on constitutional
grounds because such curricular choice advanced a religious viewpoint).
238. Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952) (holding that students
can constitutionally be dismissed from school premises to attend religious education
conducted in nonschool buildings while nonparticipants must remain in school), with Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 2037 (1948) (holding it unconstitutional to
release public school students from regular classes to attend religious instruction on public
school premises, while nonparticipants were required to stay in regular school classes). Good
News Club v Milford CentralSchool held that prayer and Bible lessons could be conducted
after school hours, on public school premises, for students who attended the public schools.
533 U.S. 98, 119-20 (2001). Good News is distinguishable from Zorach on the ground that
the religious instruction occurred outside the regular school curriculum and day, but certainly
it is a dramatic move in the direction of public support for religious instruction.
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course, exceptions. The German Ldinder of Berlin, Bremen, and
Brandenburg do not include religion as a regular part of the school
curriculum, although the option is available. It is also possible for
communities in other Liinder to have secular, nonreligious schools.239
In the United States, off public school premises time-release programs
allow religion to be taught, and religious instruction may also occur
after school hours at public schools. ' Thus, neither country is
absolutist in its decision to teach or not teach religion in public
schools.
B.

PrivateReligious Schools

The forum for public support of religion in the United States
shifted dramatically after Mueller v Alledi"' was decided in 1983,
moving from public schools to private, religious schools under the
leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Rehnquist Court treated
public accommodation of religion as an equal claimant on the public
treasury. Religious accommodationism ranks with other notable
accomplishments of the Rehnquist Court, such as diminished Free
Exercise rights," 2 enhanced attention to federalism,"3 and enhanced
police powers with respect to criminal due process rights.2" At war
with the stricter separationist direction of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence shepherded by prior Courts (most notably the Warren
Court), the Rehnquist Court reworked Establishment Clause doctrine
away from a separationist orientation (represented most prominently
by Lemon v Kurtzmai 45 ) toward an approach of formal neutrality,
239. See supra PartIII.
240. See, e.g., GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 102; Zoracb, 343 U.S. at 314-15.
241. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
242. E.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
(holding that application of state drug laws to users of peyote for religious purposes did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause).
243. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that
congressional power under the Commerce Clause did not extend to crimes insubstantially
impacting interstate commerce).
244. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (holding that police
can allow a trained dog to sniff a stopped car for drugs without any need for suspicion of a
narcotics violation).
245. 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971). Under Lemon, the Court synthesized various
strands of Establishment Clause jurisprudence employed by the Warren Court to ask first,
whether the measure had a secular purpose; second, whether its main effect neither advanced
nor inhibited religion; and, third, whether it fostered an excessive government entanglement
with religion. Id at 611-15. Some current Justices on the Court decry the test, none more
notably than Justice Scalia. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). However, the Court has not yet formally
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which holds that government must treat religion on terms equal to
other, nonreligious institutions with respect to the distribution of public
benefits." 6 Stated a different way, government may not favor one
religion over another or over nonreligion, nor disfavor any particular
religion or nonreligion, although the government may support religion
generally on the same terms as it supports secular institutions.247
It is this concept of formal neutrality we want to compare to
German law. Some caveats are in order. First, there is little
constitutional authorization of public support for religion in American
public schools, which most American students attend."8 Secondly,
formal neutrality to date has mainly been applied to nonpublic,
primarily religious schools.
Approximately eleven percent of
American students attend private schools, and approximately eightyseven percent of private school students attend religious schools, with
Catholic schools constituting about fifty-five percent of these religious
institutions.249 Thus, the degree of national public support for religion
in school is, relatively speaking, small. Third, our focus is one
following constitutional doctrine and jurisprudence. Thus, our
concentration is on a comparative look at German and American
doctrine on church-state relations in the schools. Let us now turn to an
examination of American doctrine.
The Court's translation of formal neutrality into a rule of law
consists of two main inquiries. Government may aid religion when the
"government ...program is [(1)] neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, inturn,
direct government aid to religious schools [and (2) do so] wholly as' 25a0
result of their own genuine and independent private choice."
Neutrality and individual, private choice are the two ingredients of the
test.
Unpacking these ideas we can see, first, that the inquiry into
neutrality is designed to place religious claimants on par with other
claimants in society for governmental aid, as seems consistent with a
doctrine of formal neutrality. The driving force of the idea is to
repudiated Lemon. See id.at 395 n.7 (citing the Lemon test approvingly in the majority
opinion).
246. See Witte, supm note 32, at 428-29.
247.

See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1495 (5th ed. 2005)

(describing the theory of nonpreferentialism that is reworked in this Article).
248. See Muehlhoff, supra note 19, at 452-54.
249. See COUNCIL FOR AM. PRIVATE EDUC., FACTS AND STUDIES, http://www.capenet.
org/facts.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
250. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
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discourage government hostility to religion as seemed the case, to
some, of the approach of separationism.

25

Moreover, publicly

supporting religion increases its ability to advocate for its values in the
marketplace of ideas. For many believers, public articulation and
acknowledgment of religion is an indispensably sacred part of their
lives. Historically, formal neutrality is rooted in Puritan philosophy, as
it influenced the more accommodationist civic-republican views of
those individuals in the Framers' generation like George Washington
and John Adams, who advocated for the importance of religion as a
source of morals in society and2 the two, together, as a prop for the
promotion of civility in society.11
There is certainly an equality component to religious
protection,"3 as with other rights, such as free speech254 or privacy.5 5 In
fact, an equality component may underlie most, if not all, human
rights. Every person has an equal claim to basic rights. But the source
for church-state relations in the United States Constitution is the
Establishment Clause, which provides that government "shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion," not the Equal Protection
Clause, which more reasonably bestows textual authority for a norm of
neutrality.5 6 The Establishment Clause itself does not self-evidently
bestow an equality claim, although equality and neutrality are certainly
core components of "the essential rights and liberties" of religion.5 7 If
251. Laycock, supranote 5, at 993.
252. See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1579 n.88; Witte, supra note 32, at
386-87. Chief Justice Rehnquist developed his historical case for nonpreferentialism in his
important dissent in Wallace v Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
253. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 66 (citing Letter from Madison, A
Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 82, at 8).
254. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("There is an 'equality of
status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of view an equal
opportunity to be heard." (footnote omitted)).
255. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) ("Equality of treatment and the
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both
interests.").
256. U.S. CONST. amends. 1,XIV
257. See Witte, supranote 32, at 388. "[W]hen Madison... spoke of 'equal' rights of
conscience, he did not mean to invoke equality as an independent reason for religious liberty."
Feldman, supra note 130, at 351 n.26 (citing Letter from Madison, A Memorial and
Remonstrance, supra note 82, at 8). "Rather, he meant that religious liberty was a right that
ought to extend to every person." Id. (citing Letter from Madison, A Memorial and
Remonstrance, supra note 82, at 8). The Court itself has acknowledged that inquiry into
neutrality is an Equal Protection norm. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) ("In determining if the object of a law is a neutral
one under the Free Exercise Clause, we can... find guidance in our equal protection cases?');
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questions concerning equal treatment of religion were raised under the
Equal Protection Clause it would make sense to inquire into neutrality,
a driving force of Equal Protection, under the rubric that similarly
situated people or institutions must be treated similarly or, if dissimilar
treatment is to be allowed, it must be justified by a persuasive reason."8
Equal protection would seem equipped to handle claims for equal
treatment.
It may certainly be helpful to borrow equal protection
components to buttress Establishment Clause arguments, as is done,
for example, in free speech claims.259 By comparison, however, a free
speech claim fundamentally relies on tests more derivable from textual
authority.26° The point, simply stated, is that free speech, as other
constitutional provisions, has a main test to gauge its infringement
derived from textual authority and relies on equality interests as
important, yet supplemental, support. By contrast, formal neutrality
does not center around the textual enumeration of the Establishment
Clause, but instead drafts an equality component as a main part of the
test. In this respect, the neutrality inquiry is a curious choice for the
Court, at least based on a textual methodology.
The choice is also curious as a matter of text in that it does not
directly address the Establishment Clause textual prohibition on
governmental establishment of religion. The language choice of the
Establishment Clause, after all, delimits governmental authority over
religion. Government "shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion" not an establishment of politics, economics, or
postmodemism"'

The focus, therefore, should more appropriately

center around governmental choices with respect to religion. For
example, does government establish, promote, aid, favor, disfavor,
inhibit, or impede religion, to name a few possibilities. In this respect,
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Neutrality in its
application requires an equal protection mode of analysis.").
258. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[W]e hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment."); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The EqualProtectionof the
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344, 365 (1949).
259. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
260. For example, the prohibition on governmental abridgement of ideas has as its
center a presumption against censorship or other official tampering with ideas, which seems
consistent with a textual mandate that specifies government is to make no law abridging
speech. See, e.g., R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The First
Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech ... because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed.").
261. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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the three-part Lemon test has a stronger textual tether in that the three
questions posed concern themselves with the degree of governmental
support for religion.262
Moving beyond text to substance, it is also notable that the
Court's questioning of neutrality is simply a formal, facial one. The
Court only looks to see if measures are designed to make benefits
generally available to claimants, religious or nonreligious. 263 The Court
does not engage in a more intense scrutiny of the substance of
neutrality, as is more characteristic of free speech21 or equal
protection 6 questions.
A review of several of the measures upheld under formal
neutrality illustrates the point. Focusing first on formal neutrality, the
Court in Mueller v Allen upheld a Minnesota statute that permitted
taxpayers to deduct as expenses from gross income amounts that "may
not exceed $500 [for students] in grades [kindergarten] through [sixth
grade] and $700 [for students] in grades [seven to twelve]" for tuition,
textbooks and transportation expenses.

66

In Zelman v Simmons-

Harris,the Court upheld an Ohio pilot program designed to aid the
Cleveland schools by providing tuition aid for students in kindergarten
through third grade to attend public or private schools and tutorial aid
for students who remain in public schools.67 On their face, both
measures apply evenhandedly to public and private school students.
So far, so good.
As a matter of substance, however, there is a significant disparity
between allocation of public monies to religious, as compared to
nonreligious, claimants. In the Minnesota program at issue in Mueller,
the vast bulk of tax benefits were claimed by religious students, likely
as high as ninety-six percent.161 In Zelman, ninety-six percent of the
262. See sources cited supra note 245.
263. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) ("[Wlhere a
government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to

a broad class of citizens ...the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause."). To follow Professor Laycock's dichotomy, the Rehnquist Court's

formal neutrality doctrine would constitute formal neutrality, not substantive neutrality. See
Laycock, supra note 5, at 999-1003. Formal neutrality has great appeal in its "simplicity and
apparent even-handedness' Id at 999. But it also has drawbacks, as I explain in this Article.
264. See, e.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1972) (holding a fightingwords statute unconstitutional because of overbreadth in application).
265. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding a facially
neutral ordinance unconstitutional because it was selectively applied negatively against
Chinese).
266. 463 U.S. 388,391 & n.2 (1983).
267. SeeZelman, 536 U.S. at645.
268. SeeMueller,463 U.S. at401.
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students participating in the pilot program were enrolled in religious
schools and eighty-two percent of the private schools participating in
the program were religious schools."' Certainly statistics may be
misleading. ° But any fair assessment of the evidence reasonably
discloses that the substance of the measures approved in Mueller and
Zelman disproportionately favor religion. At a minimum, these
measures constitute indirect official subsidies of religion.217 Since
most legislators are likely aware of the composition of their
constituencies, including their general religious makeup and number of
parochial schools, the subsidies may even be more overt. But the
Court does not examine the underlying motivations of legislators.272
Nor does the Court examine the empirical data resulting from the
programs."' As stated baldly by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "We would
be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially
neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various
classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law."274 The point
is simple: the inquiry into neutrality is merely facial, and it has the
effect of favoring religion, which, in fact, may be the point. Public
schools, of course, are directly funded by tax monies and, accordingly,
do not need to participate in these aid programs. In fairness, parents of
parochial school students already pay taxes to support the public
schools.'
Receiving the benefits of some tax dollars for religious
educational costs could certainly be viewed as only fair. Still,
regardless of the equities, our focus must be on the constitutional
question.

269. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647.
270. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that school programs in other states, such as
Maine or Utah, would likely result in a lesser percentage (perhaps less than forty-five
percent) of the aid going to religious schools. Id.at 657-58.
271. See Mueller,463 U.S. at 404 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding that a Minnesota
tax statute has the "direct and immediate effect of advancing religion").
272. See United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
273. See, e.g., Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401 (stating that the court should not consider
statistical evidence indicating that the effect of tax deductions was to benefit parents of
children enrolled in sectarian schools). The failure to employ effects analysis is in contrast to
other constitutional domains, such as dormant commerce clause, where effects analysis is a
primary inquiry into the constitutionality of measures. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (holding a facially neutral North Carolina statute
unconstitutional because its practical effect burdened the sale of Washington state apples).
274. Mueller,463 U.S. at 401.
275.

(1974).
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The second element of formal neutrality involves breaking the
direct link between government and the church by making monies
available to people, who then exercise "genuine and independent
private choice" to spend the monies as they like, including on religious
education if they so desire.276 In this way, the choice to support religion
is made by the individual and not the government.277
There is something to be said for this. Channeling money to
people, not government, facilitates individual choice, which might
plausibly break the link between government and religion. This is a
point well worth considering. Private decision making is different than
government decision making. No doubt, reasonable people will differ.
Moreover, this doctrine has the added benefit of encouraging voluntary
group-based religious value formation, which can help animate a
democracy and add a significant and worthy voice to public debate.
Yet, the Establishment Clause delimits governmental power; it
does not speak to individual behavior. Personal choices are quite
irrelevant to the Establishment Clause."7 Thus, the relevant question
would seem to be whether the governmental action constitutes an
establishment of religion. Whether the governmental choice is
accomplished by direct or indirect means should have some bearing on
this question, but it should not be dispositive. The real question is
whether a governmental choice to support religion, directly or
indirectly, is an establishment of religion. There can be, no doubt, a
difference of opinion on this.
To determine whether government is, indeed, supporting religion
heavily enough to constitute an "establishment" should entail a
probing examination of the purpose, background, and effects of the
measure. Certainly the seriousness of the question merits a careful
review of such a measure, one more probing than the facial review
employed under formal neutrality. The significant amount of aid and
its transparently primary effect of benefiting religion under formal
neutrality would suggest tilting more on the side of finding an
establishment of religion.
It is certainly an open question as to what constitutes an
"establishment." Is an establishment to be judged by text, originalism,
accommodationism, separationism, or some combination of all or
some of them? We would first need to set forth a plausible theory of
the Establishment Clause, which institutes a principled standard of law,
276. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
277. SeeWitters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,488 (1986).
278. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 685-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in order to make this judgment. That endeavor, however, is well
beyond the scope of this Article.
At bottom, we can see that the Court applies a facial review of
these formally neutral governmental programs that has the effect of
indirectly supporting religion. We can also see that formal neutrality is
a far cry from the separationist approach of the Warren Court and of
the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Instead,
formal neutrality is more in accord with the aspects of the Puritan
tradition that encouraged and advanced official support of religion and
influenced the religious orientation of notable civil republicans like
George Washington and John Adams.279 In this respect, formal
neutrality has more in common with the Massachusetts experience
than the 1784-1786 Virginia one."'
In sum, as a matter of constitutional methodology, formal
neutrality does not seem clearly rooted in the text of the First
Amendment, but is firmly rooted in the Puritan tradition that carried
over to influence important accommodationist civic republicans like
George Washington and John Adams.28' Certainly. formal neutrality,
with its appeal to equality, can draw upon one of the main "essential
rights and liberties" of religion." 2 Further, formal neutrality, consistent
with accommodationist, civic-republican thought, can draw upon a
long history of government accommodation of religious practice."' As
a matter of constitutional methodology, formal neutrality is on weakest
ground as a matter of text, it is on strongest ground as a matter of
tradition, and it is on solid ground as a matter of the Puritan-influenced
strand of historical practice. Thus, we can see that the debate between
separationism and accommodationism is itself a titan struggle over
constitutional methodology: text; the intent of Framers such as
279. There is some evidence that evangelicals, such as Isaac Backus, would willingly
accept official support of religion, insofar as it did not interfere with the core concern of
liberty of conscience. MARK DEWOLFE HOwE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS:
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11 (1965) ("The
evangelical principle of separation endorsed a host of favoring tributes to faith ... so
substantial that they have produced in the aggregate what may fairly be described as a de
facto establishment of religion [in which] the religious institution as a whole is maintained
and activated by forces not kindled directly by government .... "); Adams & Emmerich,
supra note 32, at 1593 ("Backus expressed no opposition to Sabbath laws, teaching
Calvinistic doctrine in the public schools, proscribing blasphemy, and conducting official
days of fasting and prayer.").
280. See supra text accompanying notes 107-114, 135-136; Witte, supra note 32, at
378-80, 383-87.
281.

Witte, supranote 32, at 388.

282.
283.

See id.
Adams & Emmerich, supa note 32, at 1629-30.
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Jefferson, Madison, Adams, and Washington; and the historical
practice of Virginia or Massachusetts.284
For our purposes, we are concerned with two primary objectives:
first, assessing the degree of public support for religion in schools in
the United States, and second, determining how American church-state
law on this question compares to German law. A third objective, to be
pursued later, is what we can learn from this comparative analysis.
The Court's change in doctrine from separationism to formal
neutrality has resulted in a decisive shift toward state support of
religion. The shift is brought out dramatically by observing the state of
affairs prior to formal neutrality. Under a separationist approach, it
was unconstitutional to aid nonpublic (mainly religious) schools by
reimbursing parents for portions of tuition costs,8 5 engaging public
school teachers in remedially educating parochial students,286 lending
instructional materials and equipment, 7 or paying the costs of field
trips for purposes related to secular courses. 8 Today, these forms of
state support of religion are constitutional under formal neutrality.8 9
Interestingly, however, we must observe that there has never been
absolute or, perhaps, even strict separationism in the United States.
Even under a separationist approach, government could support
religious schools in certain respects. 98 So, we might say that even in
the pre-Rehnquist Court era, the Court vacillated somewhat uneasily
between separationism and accommodationism. However, a major
difference was that under this earlier approach of separationism, the
Court distinguished between state support of religious schools over
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 379-98 (1985); Sloan v. Lemon, 413
U.S. 825, 834-35 (1973).
286. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985), overruled byAgostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997).
287. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835-36 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-73 (1975),
overruledby Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835-36.

288.

See, e.g., Wolman, 433 U.S. at 230-31, overruledby Mitchell,530 U.S. at 835-36.

289.

See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002) (authorizing

state support of religious schooling through tuition vouchers and tutorial aids).
290.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Our prior holdings do not call

for total separation... total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevitable."). Under separationism, the
government could support religious schools by busing parochial students. See Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Also, a government could lend textbooks on secular topics

to religious schools. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968). Finally, the
government could reimburse religious schools for the costs of state-mandated and statecomposed testing requirements. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646,661-62 (1980).
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secular matters and sectarian matters."' It was considered absolutely
off limits for government to aid religion in core religious matters,292
and it was irrelevant whether the nature of official support was
accomplished directly or indirectly2 93 Moreover, the Court in the preRehnquist era tended to agree on doctrine. 9" Most of the Justices of
this era were committed to separation of church and state as stating the
proper relationship.2 95 Their disagreements were over how strictly to
apply separationism to particular factual settings. 96

By contrast, under formal neutrality significant amounts of public
aid have been directed to religion. Although the aid was formally
available to all claimants on a neutral basis, the vast majority of the
recipients were religious schools.297 The most dramatic sums of public
aid directed to religious institutions include subsidization of parental
costs of parochial school tuition;298 supply of computer, media,
laboratory, library, and teaching aids; 299 and provision of public school
remedial education.3" Let us examine some of these cases more
carefully.
In Mitchell v Helms, the Court sanctioned the federal provision
of educational materials to religious schools.3"' The provisions
included library and media materials, computer hardware and
software, and instructional materials such as books, movie projectors,

291. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18 (holding that state support of bussing of
parochial students is neutral social welfare aid, analogous to police and fire protection).
292. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617 (invalidating a state subsidy of religious
teachers and observing that "[w]e cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious
control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects
of pre-college education").
293. See Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393-94 (1985).
294. So observes Justice Souter in his recounting of the history of the Establishment
Clause. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 876 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).

295. See, e.g., id.
296. See, e.g., id.
297. Of the participating schools in the year in question evaluated in Mitchell, fortyone of forty-six (eighty-nine percent) were religious. See id. at 803. This percentage is close
to other cases, like Zelman (eighty-two percent) and Mueller (ninety-six percent). See
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 641 (2002); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 409
(1983).
298. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646 (stating that public funds support ninety percent of
parochial school tuition costs for severely poor students); id at 708 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(noting that the "sheer quantity" of aid is unprecedented); Mueller,463 U.S. at 388 (noting
that the state tax deduction for parochial school tuition costs up to $500 or $700, depending
on the case).
299. See, e.g., Mitchell,530 U.S. at 803.
300. SeeAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,218 (1997).
301.

See530 U.S. at 802-03.
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and overhead projectors. °2 Mftchell breaks ground in one notable
respect. The plurality simply brushed aside the clear diversion of the
0 Perhaps the Court was
public aid from secular to sectarian purposes."
reluctant to scrutinize recipients' use of moneys. But we might more
plausibly understand this as simply a consequence of formal neutrality.
The real point of formal neutrality is equal treatment for religious
groups as compared to nonreligious groups. Such equality of
treatment leads, of course, to official support of religion, as it could
also lead to the official support of nonreligion if the social reality of
statistical configurations were different.
In Agostimi v Felton, the Court approved the provision of
federally funded remedial education provided by public school
teachers to parochial students on the school premises of the religious
schools, in direct contradiction of the Court's earlier finding that such
provisions were unconstitutional."° The symbolic presence of public
school employees rendering services to parochial schools was no
longer relevant in determining whether an official endorsement of
religion had occurred.3"5 Likewise, it was no longer relevant whether
an excessive entanglement of the state in religion occurred by reason
of the significant monitoring by government of religion of the uses of
the aid for secular purposes as required by the statute. °6 The contrast
in approach between Agostin and Aguilar v Felton simply illustrates
the difference in approach between formal neutrality and
separationism, as would a comparison of almost any case decided
before or after the advent of formal neutrality.
302. Id.at 803.
303. Id. at 833-34 ("[W]e agree with the dissent that there is evidence of actual
diversion and that, were the safeguards anything other than anemic, there would almost
certainly be more such evidence. In any event ... the evidence of actual diversion and the
weakness of the safeguards against actual diversion are not relevant to the constitutional
inquiry, whatever relevance they may have under the statute and regulations." (citation and
footnote omitted)). But see id. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I also disagree with the
plurality's conclusion that actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is
consistent with the Establishment Clause.").
304. 521 U.S. 203,209 (1997).
305. Seeid at234.
306. Id at 233-34. The Court abandoned the presumption that any mixing of church
and state meant religious indoctrination. Id at 234. The Court acknowledged the change in
Establishment Clause doctrine rendered by decisions like Zobrest v CatalinaFoothillsSchool
District,509 U.S. 1 (1993), Witters v Washington Department ofServices for the Blin4 474
U.S. 481 (1986), and Rosenberger v Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Agostim, 521 U.S. at 243
(O'Connor, J., concurring). These decisions undermined Aguilar v Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985), and School District v Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Agostini, 521 U.S. at 243-45.
Accordingly, the Court overruled them. The Court observed that the financial costs
associated with compliance with Aguilarwere significant and burdensome. See id. at 213.
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For our purposes, what is relevant to observe is the quite
substantial channeling of governmental aid to religious schools
accomplished through the indirect route of formal neutrality. As the
Court frankly acknowledges, a governmental program that is neutral
and operates by way of the private choice of people permits
governmental aid to reach religious institutions. 307 So blessed,
therefore, is the official provision of tuition relief,3 8 library and
teaching aids, 3" remedial educational services,3"' and learning' and
vocational aids."'
The direct or indirect role of government in funding religion is
the doctrinal line the Court is drawing at present. The endpoint of
formal neutrality, for now, is reached by the recent case Locke v
Davey, in which the Court upheld Washington's prohibition of direct
funding of pastoral education. 3 Such open, overt official funding of
the religious mission went too far, at least for some. 4 And so we are
left again with a distinction between direct governmental funding of
religion (unconstitutional), and indirect funding (constitutional).
Public subsidy of religious education is at odds with much of the
early American theoretical writing on liberty of conscience and its
protection from mixing of church and state that informed the framing
of the First Amendment religious protections. It would appear to
violate the fundamental norm of freedom from coercion of conscience
insofar as it forces any dissenting taxpayers to fund religious education
against their will. Most formally neutral programs do not provide
opportunity for opt-out provisions for dissenters, in contrast to early
American practice and current German practice.3"5 The conception of

307. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
308. See, e.g., id.;
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983).
309. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000).
310. See, e.g.,
Agostim 521 U.S. at 208-09.
311. See, e.g., Witteis, 474 U.S. at 489.
312. See, e.g., Zobrest,509 U.S. at 10.
313. 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004). Even though it was decided on Free Exercise grounds,
Locke represents the same type of program, considered under formal neutrality, as
Rosenberger,which was decided under free speech grounds. See id; Rosenberger v. Rector,
515 U.S. 819, 819-21 (1995).
314. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 725. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion
sustaining Washington's constitutional prohibition on funding religious education. Perhaps
he was motivated by federalism concerns; Washington could determine to prohibit what
Ohio, for example, allowed in Zelman. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44
(2002). Justices Thomas and Scalia would have found the funding constitutional, relying in
part on Witers. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 729-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315. See CuRmr, supra note 27, at 247.
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liberty of conscience forms the core of Establishment Clause
protections, both historically"6 and today.37
As formulated by Roger Williams, for example, the integrity of
freedom of conscience included a freedom from coercion of
conscience as the essence of the religious experience and the basis for
religious freedom.3"8 As stated by Thomas Jefferson, coercion of
conscience is inconsistent with true belief because "no man shall be
compelled to frequent or support any relig[i]ous Worship place or
Ministry whatsoever."3 9 Official support of religion leads to its
corruption; and that opinion, including religious opinion, is not within
the jurisdiction of government.32 As reworked by James Madison,
religion is a fundamental, natural right we owe to our Creator, and it
"can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence."32' Religion is to "be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate"'322 For Madison, forced payment of tax monies in support of
religious education constituted an establishment of religion. 23
Viewed from the lights of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and
other Enlightenment authority,324 the variety of formal neutrality
advanced by the Rehnquist Court, most notably in cases like Zelmai 23

316. SeeFeldman, supranote 130, at 346, 398.
317. SeeLee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591-92 (1992).
318. See WILLIAMS, supm note 80, at 11.
319. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779),

reprintedm7 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTTUTION 77 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
320. See id.
321. Letter from Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 82, at 8.
322. Id.
323. See id.
at 10 (stating that a violation for any "authority which can force a citizen
to contribute three pence ... of his property for the support of any one establishment, may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever"). In Rosenberger,
Justices Thomas and Souter debated the meaning of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance.
See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 855-59, 868-72 (1995). According to Justice
Thomas, Madison simply saw the Establishment Clause "as a prohibition on governmental
preferences for some religious faiths over others.... [Tihere is no indication that at the time
of the framing he took the ...extreme view that the government must discriminate against
religious adherents by excluding them from more generally available financial subsidies." Id
at 855-57 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas then pointed to historical examples of state
funding of religion, such as electing chaplains to Congress, granting tax exemptions for
religious bodies, and selling land reserved by Congress to support religion. See id at 858-59.
Justice Souter, by contrast, read Madison to oppose aid to religion and to advocate strict
separation of church and state. See id.
at 868-72 (Souter, J., dissenting).
324. SeeAdams & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1572.
325. 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002).
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326 would appear to be at odds with these core American
and Mueller,
religious principles. First, not all taxpayers would agree to apply their
monies in support of religious education.327 For these uncooperative,
dissenting taxpayers application of their tax monies in support of
religious education would seem to constitute coercion of conscience.
Forcing conscience is likely to induce resentment and hostility in those
coerced. This resentment is likely to lead to divisiveness in the body
politic, already abundant.328 Some form of opt-out provision for
dissenting taxpayers is necessary to ameliorate the concern of coercing
conscience,
as was done in early America and in contemporary
32 9

Germany.

Second, the mixing of church and state occasioned by indirect
public subsidy of religion may lead to corruption of religion, as
warned by separationist doctrine.3 These first steps are evident in
Zelman.3 1' A condition of participating in the pilot program is that
religious schools may not "discriminate on the basis of... religion. 332
Being obligated to follow a nondiscriminatory policy is likely to dilute
the purity of religion and involve government in supervision of
religion.
In these respects, religion may
become beholden to
3
government, a root concern of separationism.

3

326. 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983).
327. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655-56. In this respect, the Court would appear to miss
the Establishment Clause question. "The Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is
coercing parents into sending their children to religious schools...." Id.The Court tries to
save the point by observing that this question must be considered within the overall context of
school choice available to parents, public or private. Id.But the real Establishment Clause
question is not a focus on the parents sending children to religious schools. Of course, faced
with a failing public school system, most parents will choose a better school system, religious
or not. The real Establishment Clause question is whether taxpayers who do not approve of
public funding of religious schools are being coerced against their conscience to support
them, as would appear in Zelman. AccordEverson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,22-25 (1947)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that it is unconstitutional to tax those unwilling to expend
their monies for religious purposes); id at 36-37 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
328. See Letter from Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supm note 82, at 8.
329. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.
330. See supm note 126 and accompanying text.
331. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 712-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
332. Id.at 712.
333. See id.at 712-13. As Justice Souter observed, compliance with governmental
requirements of nondiscrimination means that religious schools will not be able to give
preference to members of the chosen faith, may not be able to choose members of their own
clergy as instructors, and might be prohibited from teaching certain articles of faith dealing
with faith, sinfulness, or ignorance of others due to the official mandate of not teaching hate.
334. Seeid.at712.
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As we conclude our assessment of formal neutrality, we can
discern the design of constitutional guideposts for the public funding
of a parallel, religious school education. Whether this becomes a
reality or not will depend on the democratic processes at work in
federal and state legislatures. In this respect, we can see that formal
neutrality approximates-operating indirectly, but without mirroringthe more direct German system of public support for religious
education, which is our next topic.
V.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

As we assemble what we have gathered from our comparative
examination of German and American law, we are left with this
observation: German law is in distinct ways committed to religious
values of neutrality, toleration, and nondiscrimination, values we
commonly associate with American law, but should not exclusively, as
they resonate today throughout Western culture. In this respect,
German law is moving somewhat in a separationist direction.
Conversely, American nonpreferentialism is moving distinctly in the
direction of the church-state cooperative model in place in Germany.
Let us look at this more carefully.
The German community public school model presupposes a
Christian orientation and, in this respect, is well out of line with
American law. Yet, a closer look at what role religion actually plays in
German schools may suggest that the relationship is less connected.
First, pure instruction in religious tenets is restricted to religious class.
Religious class itself is the domain of the religious community, which
picks teachers and determines religious instruction. Thus, we might
think of the public school as neutrally providing the forum for religious
instruction, but otherwise staying out of the affairs of religion.
Government is in all respects to be neutral concerning religious and
ideological beliefs. Further, each student/parent can choose the
religious instruction of choice, or none at all. We can thus see that
ample consideration is given to liberty of conscience.335
Aspects of American law approximate, but do not mirror, this
element of German law. American students may be released from
public school premises for religious instruction during the school

335. SeesupraPartII.
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day,336 and religious instruction can occur on public school premises
after school hours. 7
Outside of religious class in Germany, there can be no
dissemination of religious tenets or proselytization. Teaching of
religion is confined to religion class.138 There is room for experimenta-

tion in the laboratory of the Linder,some Ldnder are more overtly
Christian than others, as most graphically indicated in the Bavarian
Community School Case, some Linder are more secular, as in
Bremen, Berlin, and Brandenburg.
Outside of religion class,
Christianity is to be referred to only as a cultural and historical force,
not a religious one. 9 These elements resonate partly with American
law as well.3"'
Beyond these elements of overt religious exercise, government is
to be neutral, tolerant, and nondiscriminatory concerning all religious
and ideological beliefs, particularly those not in a dominant position.
The community school is obligated to facilitate a dialogue of
pluralistic religious and ideological views to expose and develop
students' intellectual and spiritual capacities. In recognition of the
increasingly pluralistic composition of German society, the
Constitutional Court is recalibrating religious freedoms toward a
distinctly more neutral position and one that identifies less with any
dominant sect, so that each religious community can more freely
compete on a level playing field. "' Commitment to these values of
neutrality, tolerance, and nondiscrimination are also substantially in
accord with American and, indeed, international norms of religious
336. SeeZorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1952).
337. SeeGood News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119-20 (2001).
338. See supraPart IV
339. See supra Part IV
340. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (holding that a Christmas
creche was a symbol of culture of the Christmas holiday, not a religious message); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) ("[S]tudy of religions and of the Bible from a literary
and historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, need
not collide with the First Amendment's prohibition .... "); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 225 (1963) (holding that a Bible can be read in public schools as a work of literature or
culture).
341. See, e.g., BVerfG Sept. 9, 2003, 108 BVerfGE 282 (310) (Muslim Teacher Head
Scant ("A regulation that prohibits teachers from displaying overtly their membership in a
particular religious community or adherence to beliefs ... is clearly in tension with especially
pronounced growing diversity of religion in society."). The Court also recognized that
acceptance of growing religious diversity in society might call for readjustment of legal
concepts, such as stricter neutrality in the obligations of members of the civil service. Id at
(298-99). The state role is to be "not a distant, absent role ... but rather a respectful,
nourishing neutrality" that accords "equality to the beliefs of all believers, understanding the
attitudes advanced [by people] on equal terms." Id
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freedom."2 There is a certain resonance of core values that comprise a
human right to religious freedom.
German law evinces further similarity with American law in that
the Basic Law sets down detailed principles of institutional separation
of church and state. For example, recall that Article 137 of the Weimar
Constitution prohibits a state church. "' Religious bodies are
authorized to regulate their own affairs within the limits of the law and,
under Article 136, government is prohibited from inquiring into
memberships of religious bodies, except for statistical purposes.'"
These principles of institutional separation of church and state are
broadly in line with American law, including the Puritan tradition. In
these respects, German law is similar to American law.
Neutrality, nondiscrimination, and tolerance are hallmarks of
American law as well. Under formal neutrality, neutrality and
nondiscrimination are central elements of Establishment Clause
doctrine." The American idea of neutrality here is a formal, facial one
which involves no substantive evaluation of the effects of government
programs. But perhaps this more flexible, more malleable concept of
neutrality has similarities to German doctrine as well. For, we can
recall under German doctrine, the state acts somewhat as a neutral
public forum in allowing the major religions-Roman Catholicism
and Protestantism-to teach their tenets in the public schools.346
Opportunities are expanding, as Islam too may soon achieve the same
benefit. 47 There is, thus, some surprising overlap in core values of
both countries' jurisprudence.
There is also similarity in the nature of state support of religious
education. Both Germany and the United States overtly fund religious
education. German law straightforwardly funds religious education by
making it a regular part of the public school curriculum. It is
342. See Michael J. Perry, A Right to Religious Freedom? The UniversalityofHuman
Rights, the Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 385, 395-400 (2005)

(discussing the Universal Declaration of Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights);
Witte, supra note 32, at 433-43.
343. SeeVERF.WEIMARart. 137.
344.

Compare BVerfG June 4, 1985, 70 BVerfGE 138 (Catholic Hospital Case)

(noting that a Catholic hospital can fire a doctor who took a public position on abortion
contrary to Catholic doctrine), with Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345-46 (1987) (exempting the church
from federal antidiscrimination laws so that it may run its affairs autonomously).
345.
346.
347.

See generallydiscussionsupa Part V
Seegenerallydiscussionsupra Part IV
See supa text accompanying note 172.
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noteworthy here that the religious bodies mainly pay the administrative
costs of the state taxes collected on behalf of religions that then go
toward paying for the costs of religious education. The German
government acts somewhat as a neutral conduit through which the
monies go to religion, and the religions can only tax members of their
sect. Nonadherents of particular religions are exempted from the
religious tax. There is, thus, minimal coercion of conscience, as
dissenters may opt out of funding religious education with which they
disagree.
By contrast, the American approach involves indirect funding of
religious education through subsidization of private, parochial school
education under formal neutrality. In this respect, the American
approach accomplishes indirectly what the Germans accomplish
directly. Perhaps this difference is more formal than substantive.
Under the American approach, private, individual choice is said to
break the link between state and church. But individuals simply
endorse the financial benefits over to religious schools of their
choosing. Public monies thus go to religious schools through the
conduit of individual exercise, even those monies of taxpayers who
may dissent from funding religious education; American programs do
not normally have opt-out provisions to guard against coercion of
conscience. In essence, the American program uses government as a
conduit through which tax monies pass to religion, as the German
program allows religions to use the apparatus of the state to raise and
administer the monies to support religious education. A major
difference in the German program is that monies are collected only
from members of particular sects for the benefit of that sect;
nonmembers are not taxed. In fact, it would appear that the German
scheme is more solicitous of the core value of liberty of conscience.
On the other hand, there is a big difference in the scale of aid
disbursed. Public funding of religious instruction is the norm in
Germany, while it is clearly a small part of the American education
system.
Assessing the programs of both countries more carefully, it seems
fair to acknowledge that they constitute, in essence, de facto
establishments of religion. The significant expenditure of public
monies to support religious education would seem to suggest this.
Whether the American program is a formal, unconstitutional
establishment of religion is, of course, a difficult and disputed inquiry

2006]

RELIGION IN THE CLASSROOM

highly contested in the Courf4 8 and in scholarly literature.349 Under
German law, of course, no problem is presented even if the program is
a formal establishment of religion, given explicit German
constitutional textual and historical authorization of such a churchstate cooperative model. But under American law, it creates a
problematic outcome given the lack of textual authority and the
contested history between separationism and accommodationism. In
contrast to German law, American formal neutrality cannot point to
definitive constitutional authority.
A further striking similarly between the two countries is that both
programs effectively empower majoritarian political constituencies to
fund their majoritarian religious counterparts.
Majoritarian
configurations of political and religious power work to support each
other. Only the dominant religions of Roman Catholicism and
Protestantism are taught in German public schools. And, again, this is
not problematic given the German church-state cooperative model.
American formal neutrality mainly funds Christian religious schoolsthe dominant religious groups-especially Catholicism, as Catholic
schools are the main competitors to the public schools, given the long
history and effective infrastructure and administration of the Catholic
church.35° In fact, the Rehnquist Court has largely succeeded in
converting important components of First Amendment religious
protections into vessels of community, democratic control."'
In conclusion, in capturing this snapshot of German and
American religious protections, it seems reasonable to conclude that
Germany's model of church-state cooperation is firmly rooted in
constitutional authority and tradition. With that observation, however,
Germany is tending toward a model of more open and welcoming
accommodation of minorities in recognition of the increasing diversity
of German society.
Commitment to values of neutrality,
nondiscrimination, and tolerance are marks of this. There is, thus, a

348. Compare, for example, the positions of the majority and dissent in Zelman v
Simmons-Harris,536 U.S. 639 (2002),
349. Compare, e.g., Feldman, supra note 130, at 418 (arguing that governmental
funding of religion is unconstitutional), with Michael W, McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update anda Response to the Critics,60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 693 (1992)
(noting that the historical record indicates that nonpreferentialism is constitutional).
350. Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Welcome to the NCES, http://www.nces.ed.gov
(last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
351. CompareZelman, 536 U.S. at 639, with Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that Free Exercise rights are circumscribed according
to norms of generally applicable neutral laws of the democratic process).
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discernible movement to values long associated with the American
model of church-state relations.
By contrast, the United States yet evidences strong commitment
to a model of separation of church and state in certain areas, most
notably public school education. In other areas, especially in our topic
of discussion-public funding of private religious education-the
American approach is more in line with a church-state cooperative
model, characteristic of Germany and most Western nations,352 than
one of separation. Certainly formal neutrality is a paradigm of the
church-state cooperative model. Other examples would be granting
tax exemptions to religious bodies ...and funding legislative
chaplains.3"
Viewed from the unique dimensions offered by comparative
law-looking outside native borders to observe workings in other
constitutional orders and then reflecting the insights learned on native
law to see where we stand, for better or for worse-we seem left with
this insight: A model of separation of church and state was uniquely
instituted in the New World of America, in Providence colony, then
Virginia, and then in the United States in essential respects. Operating
under the model of separation, religion thrived in America in the past,
and thrives today, perhaps it thrives like in no other Western country.
The question we must now face is: Are we losing one of the unique
traits that has characterized the American "livlie experiment"
(separationism) and, if so, at what cost and for what benefit?355 Is a
European model of church-state cooperation better suited to American
shores?

352. See, e.g., STEPHEN V MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF
PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIvE DEMOCRACIES 57, 67-69, 103-07, 136-44 (1977)

(observing how the Netherlands, Australia, and the United Kingdom all publicly fund
religious education); Witte, supra note 32, at 440 (arguing that most international norms
suggest church-state cooperation and that separation of church and state is exceptional); John
M. Hall, Religious Education and the Globalised Economy, http://www.studyoverseas.com/
re/jmh.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (noting state-funded religious education in Canada,
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